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JUDGES AS FRAMERS OF PLEA 
BARGAINING 
Daniel S. McConkie* 
The vast majority of federal criminal defendants resolve their cases by plea 
bargaining, with minimal judicial input or oversight. This presents significant 
issues concerning transparency, fairness, and effective sentencing. Federal 
prosecutors strongly influence sentences by the charges they select. The parties 
bargain informally outside of court and strike a deal, but defendants often plead 
guilty without a realistic understanding of their likely sentencing exposure. 
Instead, they plead guilty based on their best guess as to how judges will resolve 
certain issues and their own fear that they could get an unspecified but severe 
post-trial sentence. The judge is often reluctant to reject the parties’ deal, partly 
because the judge may have little information about the case and partly because 
the judge lacks the resources for courtroom-clogging jury trials. What is needed 
is a public, court-supervised, advocacy procedure early in the case to guide the 
parties in considering key sentencing issues and fashioning a just and reasonable 
sentence based on the judge’s feedback.  
This Article explores a proposed procedure that would do just that. Early in 
the case, and upon the defendant’s request, the parties would litigate a pre-plea 
motion procedure similar to sentencing proceedings. As part of those 
proceedings, a pre-plea, presentence report would be prepared with input from 
the parties. The motion would educate the judge about the case and enable the 
judge to issue two indicated sentences: one for if the defendant pleaded guilty as 
charged, and another for if the defendant were convicted at trial. This increased 
judicial participation through a regularized advocacy procedure would allow 
judges to help frame the parties’ discussion of sentencing issues and sentencing 
consequences earlier in the case, all without involving the judge in the parties’ 
plea discussions. Several benefits would flow from this: the plea bargaining 
process would become more transparent, resulting in increased public 
accountability; the defense attorney would have greater incentives to properly 
investigate and present key issues; and the defendant could make a more 
informed decision about whether and on what terms to plead guilty. In short, al-
hough plea bargaining is here to stay, criminal justice could be greatly improved 
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by bringing more of the plea bargaining process back into the courtroom, where 
the judge could help frame the key issues for the parties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the federal system, the vast majority—about ninety-seven percent—of 
federal criminal defendants plead guilty, giving up their constitutional right to a 
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jury trial in exchange for sentencing concessions.1 Unfortunately, federal plea 
bargaining happens with little judicial involvement—between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys, behind closed doors and with practically no public oversight. 
This secretive procedure leaves the adjudication of criminal cases to attorneys, 
not the courts. Recently, the Supreme Court acknowledged that our justice 
system is “a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”2 We must conform federal 
criminal procedure to this reality, and that will require bringing more of the 
plea bargaining process back into the courtroom where it belongs.3  
The plea bargaining process is initially framed by prosecutors’ charging 
decisions. By selecting the charges, prosecutors strongly influence the sentence. 
This is so even where mandatory minimum sentences are not implicated 
because the advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines are influential in plea 
bargaining and sentencing. Soon after indictment, the parties begin their plea 
discussions. These discussions are informal and out of court. The defense 
makes its best pitch to the prosecution but has imperfect incentives to fully 
investigate the case or to make a full presentation of all relevant issues. The 
parties make their best guess as to the likelihood of a conviction by jury, the 
court’s likely resolution of key sentencing issues, and the expected difference 
between a post-plea sentence and a post-trial sentence (“plea/trial differential”). 
Defendants decide to forego their constitutional rights and plead guilty based 
on these guesses. Put simply, defendants decide to plead guilty out of fear: they 
do not want to risk a much more severe post-trial sentence than the more 
concrete expected sentence that they will get for pleading guilty. On this basis, 
the parties ultimately strike their deal and present it to the court for approval. 
Then, for the first time, at what is likely near the end of the case, the court 
becomes significantly involved in the plea bargaining process.  
One reason why judges do not usually reject the deals4 is because they 
often have little information about the case beyond what is stated in the 
indictment. Frequently, they accept the guilty plea provisionally, pending their 
examination of the presentence report for sentencing. That report should guide 
 
 1.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS: GUILTY PLEAS AND TRIALS IN EACH 
CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT, at tbl.10, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/ 
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Table10.pdf.  
 2.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (citing Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012)). 
 3.  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) [hereinafter Bibas, Regulating]. 
This Article examines the federal system, but much of what I discuss could also apply to 
state systems. For example, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs plea 
bargaining. Many states have adopted a very similar rule. See, e.g., HAW. R. PENAL P. 11; 
TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R. CRIM. P. 11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 4.  See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 76 
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1064-66 (1976); see also Medlin v. State, 280 S.E.2d 648, 640 (S.C. 
1981) (Littlejohn & Gregory, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (“It is true that the judge, at 
least in theory, reserves to himself the right to honor or reject any plea bargain; however, as 
a practical matter, he accepts the sentence and disposition recommended by the office of the 
prosecutor in a great majority of the cases in order to expedite their disposition.”). 
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the court in considering the numerous statutory factors that are meant to make 
sentencing rational and consistent. But the parties usually contribute to that 
report’s preparation with a more practical aim: to buttress the plea agreement. 
Paradoxically, the plea agreement tends to shape the presentence report. Even if 
it does not, by the time of sentencing, the parties already have a reliance 
interest in their bargain. Thus, the defendant is usually sentenced consistent 
with the plea agreement, and the whole process of preparing the presentence 
report after the deal has been struck becomes an empty formality.5 Judges have 
a strong incentive not to reject the parties’ deal because doing so would send 
them back to the bargaining table, thereby prolonging the case and risking a 
jury trial.  
One of plea bargaining’s key infirmities is that it largely excludes judges 
until the tail end of the process. This is unfortunate for many reasons. Judges 
are institutionally more neutral and less political than prosecutors are. Article 
III judges can exert an important check on the Executive Branch’s law 
enforcement activities. Plea bargaining discussions are conducted largely on the 
basis of what the parties believe judges would do at sentencing, but judges have 
no early opportunity to dispel them of any misconceptions. Finally, on-the-
record plea proceedings early in the case would encourage the parties to 
develop sentencing issues more thoroughly and publicly.  
This Article examines these and other infirmities of federal plea bargaining 
and proposes giving judges a more central role in the process. Of course, there 
is a limit to how much an enhanced judicial role can accomplish. As long as 
prosecutors have wide discretion in selecting charges, they will likely dominate 
plea bargaining. But my proposal—a thought experiment, really—shows how 
enhanced judicial involvement could change prosecutors’ incentives by 
bringing plea bargaining into the light of the courtroom. That, in turn, could 
make plea bargaining more fair and transparent to both defendants and the 
public and more effective in arriving at just and reasonable sentences. This 
Article makes a novel contribution to the plea bargaining literature by re-
conceptualizing the judge’s role in plea bargaining and fleshing out and 
modifying some skeletal proposed reforms from the 1970s6 in light of legal 
developments over the last four decades. The older proposals would abrogate 
prosecutorial discretion and make the plea/trial differential uniform across all 
cases. Although conceptually elegant, these proposals are politically infeasible. 
My proposal is more modest, but letting judges frame the issues early in the 
case through a public proceeding would work a fundamental reform to plea 
bargaining. 
The Supreme Court recently took an important step toward encouraging 
more judicial involvement in plea bargaining in a pair of 2012 decisions, Lafler 
 
 5.  See, e.g., Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1116-19. 
 6.  See Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1059; Robert M. Sussman, 
Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972). I discuss these proposals at infra 
Part IV.A. 
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v. Cooper7 and Missouri v. Frye.8 These cases strengthened defendants’ 
protections against ineffective assistance of plea bargaining counsel, but they 
also considered how defendants might prove that their attorneys’ ineffective 
assistance had prejudiced them. This has encouraged judges to make some 
record of the parties’ plea discussions. The parties in turn must conduct their 
negotiations differently, knowing that the negotiations could become the 
subject of public litigation. Thus, Lafler and Frye have effectively invited 
judges to exert a greater influence in plea bargaining.  
This Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I briefly describe the federal 
judge’s role in plea bargaining. Part III critiques plea bargaining. In Part IV, I 
put forward my proposal to reform it, and Part V considers the implications of 
this proposal.  
I propose letting defendants request from the court, early in the case, two 
indicated sentences: one for a guilty plea and another for a post-trial sentence 
(the difference between these two sentences is called the “plea/trial 
differential”). The parties would engage in litigation similar to a sentencing 
proceeding, with the help of a pre-plea presentence report, to systematically 
explore the key sentencing issues.  
My approach is novel because it would permit the court, in determining the 
two indicated sentences, to consider case-specific factors, such as the size of 
plea/trial differential necessary for the court to process its caseload, the strength 
of the prosecutor’s case and likelihood of conviction at trial, and the potential 
undue coerciveness of the plea/trial differential where the prosecutor’s case is 
weak. Using these case-specific factors yields two benefits that are novel to the 
literature on plea bargaining reform. First, the approach is pragmatic because it 
would merely ask the sentencing court to make explicit the analysis that it 
already employs implicitly. Second, it could mitigate any undue coercion in a 
guilty plea because the court could sufficiently familiarize itself with the 
prosecution’s case to discern whether the government was offering a steep 
discount off of a potentially draconian post-trial sentence to compensate for the 
weakness of its case.  
This proposal has other significant advantages. It would allow judges to 
supervise an adversarial procedural that would help frame the parties’ 
subsequent plea negotiations with better information about the factual and legal 
contours of the case and the potential sentencing consequences. It would take 
place on the record, improving the transparency and legitimacy of the justice 
system. In seeking to provide defendants with better information as they make 
the most important decision in the case, it would comport with Padilla v. 
Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court required that defendants be advised of 
the risk of deportation before pleading guilty.9 Finally, in describing significant 
 
 7.  132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 8.  132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 9.  559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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yet achievable changes to criminal procedure, it provides federal criminal 
practitioners with a detailed roadmap for experimentation and reform.  
I. THE FEDERAL JUDGE’S ROLE IN PLEA BARGAINING  
In this Part, I describe the federal judge’s role in plea bargaining. That role 
is a minor one; prosecutors are the star of the show. Prosecutors select the de-
fendants and the charges and come to the bargaining table with the most 
leverage. Defense attorneys make their best pitch for leniency but ultimately 
encourage their clients to take a deal. Judges ensure that the plea is “knowing” 
and “voluntary” but essentially rubberstamp most plea agreements10 and 
sentence the defendants according to the parties’ agreement. Since 1974, 
federal judges have been prohibited from any participation in the plea 
discussions, and appeals courts have strictly enforced that prohibition. But 
Lafler and Frye are changing that because they require the court and the parties 
to document more of the plea bargaining process.  
Thus, Part II provides a foundation for understanding some of the core 
weaknesses of federal plea bargaining described in detail in Part III: 
prosecutors have too much influence; judges have too little; defense counsel 
lacks a formal procedure to flesh out mitigating factors; the defendant often 
lacks reliable information about his actual sentencing exposure; and the whole 
bargaining process lacks rigor, transparency, and accountability. 
A. The Nuts and Bolts of Federal Plea Bargaining 
“Plea bargaining” refers generally to defendants giving up their trial-
related constitutional rights and pleading guilty in exchange for prosecutorial 
concessions, like lighter sentences and dismissals of charges. Nearly all federal 
convictions (ninety-seven percent) and state convictions (ninety-five percent) 
result not from trials, but from guilty pleas.11 By 1971, the Supreme Court had 
acknowledged that plea bargaining was an “essential component of the 
administration of justice.”12 More recently, that same acknowledgement 
became more blunt: “[plea bargaining] is the criminal justice system.”13 “Plea 
bargaining’s triumph” over the jury trial is nearly complete: prosecutors, 
 
 10.  See, e.g., Bibas, Regulating, supra note 3; Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial 
Participation in Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 201-02, 
206 (2006) (referring to judges as “passive verifiers of plea bargains”).  
 11.  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (2012); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. 
 12.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 13.  Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (emphasis in original) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William 
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)). 
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judges, defense attorneys and defendants all have come to see plea bargaining 
as in their best interest.14  
In the federal system, plea bargaining is largely conducted outside of the 
courtroom but culminates on the record with a guilty plea. Typically, after the 
grand jury issues an indictment and the defendant is arraigned, the defense 
attorney and the prosecutor negotiate privately. Once they reach an agreement, 
a hearing is calendared for a change of plea. A plea agreement typically binds 
the prosecutor to dismiss charges or not to bring particular charges.15 The 
agreement often contains a sentencing recommendation that does not bind the 
court, although the court usually follows the recommendation.16 Alternatively, 
the agreement may contain a binding sentencing recommendation.17 The judge 
may, but very seldom does, reject a plea agreement that dismisses charges or 
binds the court.18 In that case, the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea.19 
Thus, for most defendants, their “day in court” is limited to short, uncontested 
hearings preceding a guilty plea.  
The sentencing differential between those defendants who plead guilty and 
those who are convicted after a jury trial underlies our whole system of pleas. 
Put simply, defendants plead guilty primarily because they fear getting a much 
longer sentence if they lose at trial.20 The main policy rationale for this 
“plea/trial differential”21 is that it incentivizes guilty pleas over time-
consuming jury trials, allowing prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys to 
process more cases.22 The federal system as currently funded could not handle 
the strain of trying every case.23  
The United States Sentencing Guidelines are highly influential in 
determining federal sentences. Even though the Supreme Court made the 
 
 14.  GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
IN AMERICA, 175-80 (2003) [hereinafter FISHER]; see also STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE 
MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 30-34 (2012).  
 15.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1)(A). 
 16.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1)(B). 
 17.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1)(C). 
 18.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(5); see also Alschuler supra note 4. 
 19.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(5). 
 20.  Jeffery T. Ulmer, et al., Trial Penalties in Federal Sentencing: Extra-Guidelines 
Factors and District Variation, 27 JUST. Q. 560, 581 (2010) [hereinafter Ulmer] 
(summarizing interviews with federal court actors). 
 21.  Commentators have referred to this differential alternatively using such terms as a 
“plea discount” or a “trial penalty.” To facilitate a broader discussion, I use the term 
“plea/trial differential.” 
 22.  Nancy J. King, et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences 
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
959, 964 (2005) [hereinafter King] (discussing widely held “efficiency theory” of plea 
bargaining).  
 23.  As Justice Scalia put it, the system could “grind to a halt.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. 
Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining 
and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 (1979)). Ulmer finds that the plea/trial differential 
is greatest in districts with higher caseload pressure. Ulmer, supra note 20, at 579. 
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Guidelines advisory in 2005,24 as of 2012, federal judges only sentenced below 
the advisory guideline range without government concurrence in about eighteen 
percent of cases.25 Under these Guidelines, a fixed plea/trial differential has 
been formalized, in part, as the “acceptance of responsibility” reduction, 
amounting to two or three offense levels.26 That reduction tends to be about 
one-third of the post-trial sentence for those who accept responsibility for their 
crimes by pleading guilty. The reduction—designed to encourage guilty 
pleas—is virtually assured when the defendant pleads guilty27 and virtually 
unheard of otherwise.28  
In practice, the plea/trial differential can be even greater than the 
acceptance of responsibility reduction alone would suggest. First, only those 
defendants who plead guilty can hope for government recommendations of 
sentences below the otherwise applicable guideline range, such as for providing 
substantial assistance or participating in an early-disposition (“fast-track”) 
program.29 In fact, one study has confirmed that, even controlling for Guideline 
reductions such as acceptance of responsibility, obstruction of justice, and 
substantial assistance, there is still a plea/trial differential.30 Second, 
prosecutors often threaten to file more serious charges, sometimes carrying a 
mandatory minimum, if the defendant does not plead guilty.31 Third, 
prosecutors often make plea offers at the low end of the applicable guideline 
range,32 but their post-trial recommendations may be at the high end of that 
 
 24.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005). 
 25.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS: NATIONAL COMPARISON OF SENTENCE IMPOSED AND POSITION RELATIVE TO THE 
GUIDELINE RANGE, at tbl.N, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Tabl
eN.pdf [hereinafter SENTENCING COMMISSION Table N].  
 26.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2004). 
 27.  Sentencing Commission data confirms that this reduction is granted in over ninety-
five percent of federal convictions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS: OFFENDERS RECEIVING ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
REDUCTIONS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY, at tbl.19, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/Tabl
e19.pdf. In more serious cases, the prosecutor has discretion to move for the reduction of one 
additional offense level point if the defendant pleads guilty sufficiently in advance of trial. 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2004).  
 28.  The Commentary to the Guidelines states that the acceptance of responsibility 
reduction will only be granted “in rare situations” if the defendant does not plead guilty. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 at cmt.2. I am not aware of data regarding how 
often the reduction is actually awarded post-trial, but I believe it is rare.  
 29.  SENTENCING COMMISSION Table N, supra note 25.  
 30.  Ulmer, supra note 20, at 575. Another common reason for the plea/trial differential 
is that a jury trial may bring aggravating sentencing factors more fully into the light. Id. at 
581.  
 31.  Id. at 582. 
 32.  Dawn Reddy, Guilty Pleas and Practice, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1117, 1136 (1993); 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.400(B) (“The 
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range, effectively increasing the plea/trial differential by two offense levels. 
Finally, upward departures may be granted for reasons related to criminal 
history issues, dismissed and uncharged conduct, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, or for aggravating circumstances “not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission.”33  
Prosecutors are the primary movers in federal plea bargaining. They 
choose their defendants and the charges, and that choice is virtually 
unreviewable. Often, they bring very strong cases in which a jury would almost 
certainly convict. The defendant thus must plead guilty, generally on plea terms 
favorable to the prosecution. Judges generally go along with these plea 
agreements because they lack resources to preside over many trials.34 This 
broad prosecutorial discretion is a hallmark of the American criminal justice 
system and borders on an inquisitorial, rather than adversarial, role.35  
The prosecutor’s plea offer is usually based on the defendant’s criminal 
conduct and history, without reference to the full analysis of the defendant’s 
background and characteristics provided in the presentence report.36 
Prosecutors’ offers in many districts are still pegged to the advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines, which promote uniform, if severe, sentences throughout the nation. 
The Guidelines reduce most cases to a mathematical formula. Prosecutors 
typically prefer to make offers based on that formula because it promotes 
uniform, objectively justifiable sentences.  
Prosecutors’ systemic leverage sharply circumscribes the role and utility of 
defense counsel in plea bargaining. Defense attorneys know that the defendant 
must plead guilty or face a much longer post-trial sentence. While federal 
public defenders are savvy repeat players, privately retained counsel often have 
fewer resources, institutional and otherwise, to gauge the potential sentencing 
consequences of the case. Informal, unstructured, and off-the-record 
negotiations do not encourage defense counsel to thoroughly investigate legal 
issues and mitigating facts, present them persuasively to the prosecution, or 
aggressively litigate disputed issues. To the extent that defense attorneys are 
under-resourced or even unskilled, the entire system loses out, particularly the 
 
plea agreement may have wording to the effect that once the range is determined by the 
court, the United States will recommend a low point in that range.”). 
 33.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(a)(1) (2004). These four 
categories account for nearly eighty-three percent of all upward departures. U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, 2012 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS: REASONS GIVEN BY 
SENTENCING COURTS FOR UPWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE GUIDELINE RANGE, at tbl.24, 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_ 
Sourcebooks/2012/Table24.pdf. 
 34.  The prosecutor has no obligation to make a plea offer, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 
U.S. 545, 559 (1977), nor must the court accept it, Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
262 (1971). 
 35.  Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2123-30 (1998) [hereinafter Lynch]; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of 
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1044-45 (2006).  
 36.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1062-63. 
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defendant. Without effective defense presentation of exculpatory and 
mitigating evidence, there can be no counterpunch to the prosecution’s heavy 
blows.37  
There is an important exception to the foregoing. The most skilled and 
best-funded defense attorneys (most commonly found in white-collar cases 
with wealthy defendants) understand how prosecutorial discretion works. They 
make detailed presentations to prosecutors concerning their clients’ defense 
during the plea bargaining process and often obtain a favorable plea agreement 
before an indictment is filed. Those attorneys understand that our criminal 
justice system can perhaps best be understood as administrative, with the 
principal decision-making authority vested in the prosecutor. Thus, they put 
enormous effort and resources into trying to influence prosecutorial 
decisions.38 This describes a relatively small percentage of federal cases, 
though.39  
Procedurally, once the deal is struck, guilty pleas are governed by Rule 11 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 11 does not come into play 
until the parties reach an agreement on their own, and the Rule neither regulates 
nor gives the parties guidance in framing those discussions. The Rule provides 
that the judge “must not participate in these discussions”40 and limits the 
judge’s role to taking the guilty plea. Because the parties negotiate off the 
record, judges cannot easily supervise those discussions, except to ask whether 
the defendant has been unduly influenced to plead guilty.41 
Under Rule 11, the judge seeks a knowing and intelligent waiver of the 
defendant’s rights,42 including the right to plead not guilty,43 the right to a jury 
trial,44 and the right to appeal.45 The judge also must advise the defendant of 
the maximum penalties46—though such penalties are rarely imposed—and any 
mandatory minimum penalties.47 The judge “must determine that there is a 
 
 37.  Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2464 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside]; Albert W. Alschuler, The 
Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).  
 38.  Lynch, supra note 35, at 2123-29. 
 39.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
“DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES” (Nov. 2000), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf (finding that only one-third of federal 
defendants have retained counsel, and that who have representation are typically in white 
collar cases). 
 40.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
 41.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(d) advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment. 
 42.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(F) advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment. This 
essentially codifies the Supreme Court’s decision in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 
(1969), which required such advisements.  
 43.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B). 
 44.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(C). 
 45.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 46.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H). 
 47.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I). 
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factual basis for the plea.”48 This requirement can be satisfied, regardless of the 
quantum of evidence, if the defendant admits to conduct that would satisfy the 
elements of the charged statute.49 The judge must decide whether the plea is 
voluntary and not a result of “force, threats, or promises (other than promises in 
a plea agreement).”50 The voluntariness of a guilty plea can be determined 
“only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”51  
Generally, following the guilty plea, the presentence report is prepared 
pursuant to Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to aid the judge 
in sentencing.52 The defendant may consent to the report’s disclosure to the 
court before he is convicted.53 The purpose of this policy is to prevent the 
judge, who may have to preside over a jury trial, from being exposed to 
prejudicial information about the defendant.54 Unfortunately, because the 
report is prepared after the parties strike their deal, they cannot benefit from the 
probation officer’s investigation and analysis of the case, and the plea deal 
usually will largely determine the sentence, regardless of what the report 
ultimately says.55 
This unfortunate timing of the presentence report leaves the parties and 
court without helpful information and analysis. The presentence report must 
calculate the applicable guideline range, identify any other factors relevant to 
sentencing,56 and discuss the defendant’s history57 and the crime’s impact on 
any victims.58 The report also may include the defendant’s statement to the 
probation officer if the defendant consents.59 Once a draft report has been 
prepared, the parties may conduct litigation over it. At sentencing, the parties 
 
 48.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3). The “factual basis” requirement ensures that the guilty 
plea is voluntary by making sure that the defendant’s factual admissions constitute the crime 
to which he is pleading guilty. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (citation 
omitted); see also United States v. Newman, 912 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that factual basis requirement is prophylactic, not constitutional). “[I]nvestigation into the 
factual basis of guilty pleas acts to increase the visibility of charge reduction practices, a 
common form of plea agreement.” AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, standard 1.6 cmt. (Approved Draft 1968). Thus, the inquiry into whether there is 
sufficient evidence of the defendant’s guilt is broader than the factual basis inquiry, because 
the latter does not concern itself with what actually happened but rather with the conduct to 
which the defendant admits. 
 49.  Lynch, supra note 35, at 2122 n.5 (citing United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 
1524 (2d Cir. 1997)); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation In Plea Negotiations: A 
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2006). 
 50.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2). 
 51.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). 
 52.  I argue in Part III that the presentence report would be more useful if prepared 
before, not after, the guilty plea. 
 53.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1); Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492 (1969). 
 54.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1).  
 55.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1). 
 56.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(1). 
 57.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d)(2)(A) 
 58.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (d)(2)(B). 
 59.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2). 
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may object to the presentence report60 and introduce evidence.61 The defendant 
may speak.62 Victims are permitted to be reasonably heard.63 Unfortunately, 
because this process generally occurs only after the parties have reached a plea 
agreement, it does not help guide the court and the parties in reaching a just and 
reasonable disposition of the case.  
B. Rule 11’s Prohibition on Judicial Participation in Plea Discussions 
Before 1974, direct judicial participation in plea bargaining was “common 
practice.”64 But that year, Congress amended Rule 11 to forbid such 
participation.65 The concern was that defendants might feel coerced by the 
judge into pleading guilty and that plea bargaining judges might not be able to 
objectively assess the voluntariness of the guilty pleas.66 The prohibition is 
prophylactic; it is designed to protect constitutional rights, but it itself is not a 
constitutional rule.67  
The circuit courts have interpreted the injunction against judicial 
participation in plea negotiations very strictly.68 In one important case, United 
States v. Werker,69 the defendant, Santos-Figueroa, faced a twenty-five year 
maximum sentence for a violent attempted robbery, and the federal prosecutor 
refused to plea bargain. Santos-Figueroa asked District Judge Werker for an 
assurance that he would receive no more than ten years on a guilty plea. The 
judge, with the defendant’s consent, ordered a pre-plea presentence report to be 
prepared and announced he would inform the defendant of his intended 
sentence at a future pre-trial hearing. The judge specified that the indicated 
sentence would be the same whether the defendant pleaded guilty or was 
 
 60.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(1). 
 61.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(2). 
 62.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(A). 
 63.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i)(4)(B). 
 64.  United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (2013) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 
advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment). 
 65.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).  
 66.  Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2146; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes 
to 1974 amendment; United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (arguing that judicial plea bargaining is coercive). 
 67.  McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969).  
 68.  See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 489 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (finding that the 
judge violated Rule 11 by inviting defendant to plead guilty and telling him that a defendant 
in a similar case had received a low sentence); United States v. Cano-Varela, 497 F.3d 1122, 
1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding that Rule 11 was violated where judge told defendant 
that he faced a potentially “harsh” post-trial sentence and he could “perhaps get a much 
better, much lesser sentence” on a plea deal); United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 
2002) (finding that Rule 11 was violated where judge told defendant the sentence he would 
receive on a guilty plea); see also Prohibition of Federal Judge’s Participation in Plea 
Bargaining Negotiations Under Rule 11(e) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 161 
A.L.R. FED. 537 (2000) (collecting cases). 
 69.  535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1976). 
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convicted at trial.70 The government objected to the procedure and sought 
mandamus. The Second Circuit granted mandamus, interpreting Rule 11’s 
prohibition on plea bargaining very broadly to mean that “the sentencing judge 
should take no part whatever in any discussion or communication regarding the 
sentence to be imposed prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction, or 
submission to him of a plea agreement.”71 The appellate court reasoned that 
Judge Werker’s procedure violated judicial neutrality and could make the 
defendant feel coerced into taking the court’s offer, especially where the 
government was not a party to the discussions.72 
In 1984, there was another significant change to the balance of power 
between judges and prosecutors in plea bargaining. Before then, federal 
sentencing was indeterminate: that is, the judge could sentence anywhere 
within a statutory range. That gave judges relatively greater sway over 
sentencing than they have now. But with the passage of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, sentencing fundamentally changed.73 The Act resulted in binding 
sentencing guidelines that closely tied prosecutorial charging decisions to 
sentences.74 Prosecutors, through their selection of charges, had much greater 
power over sentencing under that regime. Of course, as stated above in Part 
II.A, those guidelines are now advisory, but they are still highly influential. The 
upshot is, relative to the pre-1974 regime, federal judges until recently have had 
reduced power in plea bargaining and sentencing. 
C. Lafler and Frye Expand the Judge’s Role 
 Fast forward several decades, and the pendulum is swinging back in the 
other direction. In 2012, the Supreme Court handed down two opinions 
expanding the right to effective counsel in plea negotiations and, perhaps even 
more importantly, strengthening the legal foundation for greater judicial 
involvement in the plea bargaining process.  
In Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, pre-trial ineffective assistance of 
counsel led the defendants to persist in their pleas of not guilty instead of taking 
advantage of relatively favorable plea offers.75 When Anthony Cooper was 
convicted at trial after rejecting the prosecution’s offer based on bad legal 
 
 70.  Id. at 202.  
 71.  Id. at 201. 
 72.  In states without Rule 11’s prohibition on judicial plea bargaining, the court may 
follow a Werker-style procedure. See, e.g., People v. Cobbs, 505 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Mich. 
1993) (finding that the judge may indicate a sentence on the record for the case as charged 
and for any reduction of charges contemplated by the prosecutor, although the judge “must 
not state or imply alternative sentencing possibilities on the basis of future procedural 
choices, such as an exercise of the defendant’s right to trial.”). 
 73.  Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987. 
 74.  Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable 
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1687-89 (1992). 
 75. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 
(2012). 
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advice, he received a sentence much longer than he would have recently under 
a plea deal.76 In Lafler v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that he had been 
prejudiced by his attorney’s ineffective assistance.77 The Lafler court 
reaffirmed that the right to counsel extends to the plea bargaining process,78 
and that the defendant was prejudiced if he could show “the outcome of the 
plea process would have been different with competent advice.”79 To do that, 
the defendant would have to show that “but for the ineffective advice of 
counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been 
presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and 
the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening 
circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the 
conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less 
severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.”80 In 
dissent, Justice Scalia complained that the majority opinion elevated plea 
bargaining from a “necessary evil” to a “constitutional entitlement.”81  
In Missouri v. Frye,82 handed down the same day, the Supreme Court 
considered similar facts. Galin Frye’s attorney never conveyed a favorable 
offer from the prosecutor to him. The offer lapsed, and he ended up pleading 
guilty without a plea agreement and receiving a much longer sentence. The 
Supreme Court found that Frye’s attorney had been ineffective in failing to 
convey the offer.83 That this ineffectiveness was prejudicial could be shown 
where there was (1) a “reasonable probability [the defendant] would have 
accepted the [lapsed] plea offer”; (2) a “reasonable probability the plea would 
have been entered without the prosecution canceling it or the trial court 
refusing to accept it”; and (3) a “reasonable probability” that the defendant 
would have received a more favorable sentencing outcome under the plea.84 
Lafler and Frye do much more than strengthen the right to effective 
assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. In setting forth fact-intensive 
tests for prejudice, both opinions invite prudent judges to make a better record 
of the parties’ plea negotiations. In fact, such a record would be necessary to 
properly adjudicate future claims of ineffective assistance of plea bargaining 
counsel. For example, in Frye, the Supreme Court suggested that prosecutors 
make formal, written offers to the defense and put those offers on the record.85 
And federal prosecutors have been doing even more to protect themselves 
against Lafler- and Frye-type claims. For example, before a case goes to trial, 
 
 76.  Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. at 1384. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 1385. 
 81.  Id. at 1397.  
 82.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 83.  Id. at 1408.  
 84.  Id. at 1409. 
 85.  Id. at 1408-09. 
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many federal prosecutors put on the record that a plea offer has been made, that 
the defendant and his attorney have discussed it, and that the defendant has 
rejected it. That hearing is sometimes referred to as a “no-plea colloquy.”86 
Federal prosecutors in some districts are requesting that defense attorneys file 
signed declarations under seal describing their advice to clients about the plea 
offers and their clients’ reasons for rejecting them.87 Some judges may choose 
to elicit from defense counsel, perhaps in camera, why the offer was rejected.88  
These sensible procedures are in line with Lafler and Frye. It could be 
argued that, in documenting only failed plea discussions, these procedures are 
not in tension with Rule 11’s injunction that judges not participate in plea 
discussions. But there is a tension: the parties might conduct those discussions 
differently knowing that they had to report on not only the outcome but also the 
substance of the discussions to the judge. Where the court knows nothing of the 
parties’ plea discussions, those discussions are in some sense private: between 
the prosecution and the defense and no one else. But where those discussions 
must be publicly revealed to the judge in future litigation over defense 
counsel’s effectiveness, the parties may change their approach entirely to plea 
discussions. Thus, Lafler and Frye, without mentioning Rule 11’s injunction 
against judicial plea bargaining, encourage judges to make a record of plea 
bargaining, and the parties consequently change their behavior to appear more 
reasonable to the judge and the public. In this way, judges are exerting a 
positive influence on the parties’ plea discussions without directly participating 
in them. As we will see below in Part III, my proposal works similarly. But 
first, we turn in Part II to evaluating the merits of this federal plea bargaining 
regime. 
II. FEDERAL PLEA BARGAINING OPERATES WITH TOO LITTLE JUDICIAL 
OVERSIGHT, PUTS TOO MUCH POWER IN PROSECUTORS’ HANDS, AND 
IS CONFUSING AND UNFAIR TO DEFENDANTS  
I argue in this Part that federal plea bargaining, which I described in Part I, 
suffers from several deficiencies. Defendants are asked to knowingly give up 
their constitutional rights without guidance from the court as to their actual 
sentencing exposure. The system relies too much on prosecutors and not 
enough on judges, who are better, by virtue of their institutional role, at judging 
 
 86. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler and Frye, LAW OFFS.TIMOTHY E. 
WARRINER, http://www.warrinerlaw.com/articles/the-consequences-of-the-supreme-courts-
decisions-in-lafler-and-frye-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-in-plea-negotiation (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2014).  
 87.  Id.; see also Motion Pursuant to Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, LAW 
PROFESSORS BLOG NETWORK, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/motion-
pursuant-to-lafler-and-frye-1.pdf (last visited Jan. 2, 2014) (detailing prosecutor’s motion in 
Western District of Tennessee). 
 88.  Laurie L. Levenson, Peeking Behind the Plea Bargaining Process: Missouri v. 
Frye & Lafler v. Cooper, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 457, 488 (2013), available at 
http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol46/iss2/22 [hereinafter Levenson].  
76 STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW [Vol. 26:61 
and sentencing the individual defendants before them. The system does not do 
enough to help defense attorneys bring to light, in an organized fashion, 
favorable facts to their clients during the plea bargaining stage. Because plea 
bargaining is largely conducted off the record, the system does not catch errors 
(such as ineffective assistance of counsel), and the public does not find out why 
concessions are made. The presentence report, which is prepared only after the 
guilty plea, is underutilized; if prepared earlier in the case, it could rationally 
guide the plea negotiations. These problems point to my proposed reform in 
Part III: a formal, public, pre-trial procedure at the defendant’s request that 
allows the parties to litigate the appropriate sentence in the plea bargain and 
post-trial scenarios. 
A. An Uncertain Plea/Trial Differential Is Unduly Coercive, and Judges 
Do Nothing to Dispel This Uncertainty  
Because defendants in the federal system usually do not know the plea/trial 
differential in advance, they can only guess how long their post-trial sentence 
will be. However, they do know that their sentence could be very long.89 
Because judges ultimately impose the sentence, they are well-situated to dispel 
most of this doubt. But they do not, primarily because they lack sufficient 
information about the case and do not want to be seen as partial. Unfortunately, 
by not weighing in, they effectively approve of the coercion inherent in an 
uncertain plea/trial differential.  
When defendants go to trial without understanding the risks involved, they 
take “a plunge from an unknown height.”90 This creates a “general atmosphere 
of intimidation.”91 Such a regime requires a large plea/trial differential to exact 
guilty pleas, as compared to a system in which the differential is made 
explicit.92 For example, a defendant facing a known plea/trial differential of 
twelve months would be equally incentivized by a plea/trial differential that 
was just as likely to be six months as eighteen months (leaving the defendant’s 
risk aversion to the side). Defendants cannot accurately gauge the plea/trial 
differential because that differential could depend on several factors, such as 
uncertain application of the Sentencing Guidelines and the strength of the 
prosecution’s case.93 Furthermore, now that the Sentencing Guidelines are 
 
 89.  See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 21.1(g) (3d ed. 2011) 
(citing MILTON M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCE OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES 
AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS, 157-58 (1978)). 
 90.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1081; see Bibas, Regulating, 
supra note 3, at 1140 (arguing that Padilla v. Kentucky “squarely recognized that, to make 
bargaining just, defendants need information to evaluate bargained-for sentences”).  
 91.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1081, 1087. 
 92.  Id. at 1080.  
 93.  See my discussion about the factors that a trial judge should consider in calculating 
a plea/trial differential. Part IV(E)(2), infra. 
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advisory, federal sentencing has become even less predictable, although it is 
not clear whether the average plea/trial differential has changed.94 
Even defendants who have potential defenses or who are innocent may 
plead guilty when faced with potentially sky-high plea/trial differentials. They 
accept a relatively certain bargained-for outcome rather than risk a devastating 
post-trial sentence.95 
Plea bargaining is even more coercive where, as is often the case in the 
federal system, the potential prison sentences are lengthy. Prosecutors need 
higher plea/trial differentials to tempt defendants to plead out to long sentences. 
For example, a defendant faced with a plea offer of one year and an anticipated 
post-trial sentence of two years might decide to try his chances at trial because 
two years of custody might not seem long compared to the chance of an 
acquittal. In contrast, if the penalties for the same offense were ten years on a 
plea and twenty years post-trial, defendants are less likely to gamble with 
longer periods of their lives.96  
Relatedly, several common federal criminal statutes carry high statutory 
maximum penalties, which accommodate large plea/trial differentials.97 The 
court advises defendants of these penalties before the guilty plea, typically at 
the arraignment.98 This advisement, which carries the judge’s imprimatur, is 
misleading: the maximum penalty almost is never imposed. For example, even 
though drug charges often carry maximum penalties of twenty years, forty 
years, or life,99 drug sentences in fact average only seventy months.100 
Notwithstanding, the maximum possible penalty can have an anchoring effect 
on future plea negotiations.101 And even if defendants know that an average 
 
 94.  Id. Compare Crystal S. Yang, Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities Increased 
in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker (University of Chicago Law 
School Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 662, 2d Ser. 
2013), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/662-csy-sentencing.pdf (arguing 
that the differential has decreased), with Ulmer, supra note 20, at 27 (arguing that trial 
penalties might increase post-Booker). 
 95.  Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1239 (2008) [hereinafter Covey] (citing Albert W. 
Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60-69 (1968), 
and Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 531-36 (2005)). 
 96.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2504-07 (discussing variations 
of future discounting among different types of defendants).  
 97.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (imposing a twenty-year maximum if defendant 
has a prior “aggravated felony”); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (imposing a mandatory minimum 
of ten years to life for specified drug trafficking offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) 
(imposing a twenty-year maximum for wire fraud).  
 98.  FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H). 
 99.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012).  
100.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, QUICK DATA FACTS ON FINAL FY2011 NATIONAL 
DATA, (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/ 
Federal_Sentencing_Statistics/Quick_Data_Facts_FY2011.pdf.  
101.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2519, 2533. 
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sentence is much lower than the maximum, they are understandably risk-averse 
because they may feel that their life is on the line. 
Sometimes, the coercion inherent in the plea/trial differential comes 
exclusively through the prosecutor. Because several federal statutes carry 
mandatory minimum sentences, the prosecution can force guilty pleas by 
threatening to bring (“stack”) these additional charges.102 Even if the defense 
correctly guessed that the court would not impose a higher post-trial sentence 
than the mandatory minimum, the differential between the likely sentence on a 
plea and the mandatory minimum sentence that the defendant faced post-trial 
could still be huge. 
By pleading guilty, defendants waive constitutional rights, and those 
waivers must be made with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances 
and likely consequences.”103 Without knowing the likely sentencing outcomes 
of a guilty plea versus a jury trial, defendants simply cannot be said to have 
made a knowing waiver. 
Because judges ultimately impose the sentence, they are well-situated to 
dispel most of this doubt. However, judges generally lack sufficient 
information about the case and do not want to be seen as biased, so they do not 
intervene, thereby implicitly approving of the coercion inherent in the uncertain 
plea/trial differential.  
B. Too Much Prosecutorial and Not Enough Judicial Discretion  
Prosecutors have dual roles: to enforce the law as advocates and to see that 
justice is done. Therein lies some tension: prosecutors must strike “hard blows” 
without striking “foul ones.”104 Because prosecutors choose the charges and 
sentencing is largely guideline-driven, their discretion shapes case outcomes 
more than judges’ discretion does. 
Federal prosecutors generally prefer the Sentencing Guidelines regime 
because it promotes greater predictability and uniformity of sentences.105 This 
allows federal law enforcement to implement nationwide policy objectives. 
Unfortunately, this simplification can lead to unalike cases being treated as 
alike. In contrast, judges do not act in concert with each other; they take cases 
one at a time. Judges, who address defendants directly in court, may feel a 
greater responsibility than some prosecutors do to consider the effect of a 
 
102.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 841(b) (2012) (imposing mandatory minima of five, ten, 
twenty years, or life for drug trafficking); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (imposing five-year 
mandatory minimum penalty for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence 
or drug trafficking offense); 18 § U.S.C. 1028A(a)(1) (2004) (imposing two-year mandatory 
minimum penalty for aggravated identity theft). 
103.  Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748, 755 n.6 (1970). 
104.  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
105.  See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.745(a) (2009) (“If the court is 
considering a departure for a reason not allowed by the guidelines, the prosecutor should 
resist.”). 
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conviction on defendants and their families. Our sky-high incarceration rates106 
demonstrate that the Department of Justice and Bureau of Prisons value 
punishment over rehabilitation, but individual judges may choose to disagree 
with that policy choice.  
Federal sentences should consider the defendant as an individual and 
consider alternatives to incarceration.107 But this often is not the case because 
prosecutors drive charging and plea bargaining with little input or oversight by 
judges. The prosecution’’s offers are made without reference to a presentence 
report but rather with an eye toward uniform sentences based on the criminal 
conduct, not the defendant’s background or a full consideration of all of the 
purposes of the criminal law. The court participates in the back end only of this 
process when it approves the plea agreement, putting its imprimatur on a final 
product that bears little judicial imprint. In contrast, a greater role for federal 
judges in the plea bargaining process might result in sentences more carefully 
tailored to the unique circumstances of each defendant. 
Judges have a small role in adjudicating cases and sentencing. Plea 
bargaining, driven by prosecutors, collapses adjudication and sentencing into 
one.108 Judges maintain their neutrality by not getting into the fray of plea 
bargaining. Instead, the prosecution and the defense settle the case with little 
judicial participation.109 The plea agreement often preempts or severely 
circumscribes the court’s ability to exercise its discretion to sentence the 
defendant.110 Rule 11’s general injunction against judicial participation in plea 
negotiations is well-intentioned but overly broad. It exalts neutrality at the 
expense of letting judges examine the cases before them and provide the 
defendant with helpful information. Although the judge’s impartiality is 
undisputed, this is only because she has almost no meaningful involvement 
with the case.  
 
106.  See Lauren E. Glaze & Erinn J Herbermann, Correctional Populations in the 
United States, 2012, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4843 (stating that one in every 108 adults is 
incarcerated in prison or jail); see also Lynn Adelman, What the Sentencing Commission 
Ought to Be Doing: Reducing Mass Incarceration, 18 MICH. J. RACE & L. 295, 295 (2013) 
(“[T]he United States now incarcerates so many people that it has become an outlier; this is 
not just among developed democracies, but among all nations, including highly punitive 
states such as Russia and South Africa.”).  
107.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). 
108.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1062, 1118-19. 
109.  Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).  
110.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 288-89. True, American law has long constrained 
judges’ sentencing discretion by statute. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 479 
(2000) (quoting John H. Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French 
Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900, 13, 36-37 (Prof. 
Dr. Antonio Padoa Schioppa ed., 1987)).  
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C. Defense Attorney Disadvantages  
Shortcomings in defense counsel also limit the defendant’s ability to 
receive justice due to the economic realities of defense work and the difficulty 
of determining an appropriate sentence during the plea discussions.  
The Supreme Court has sanctioned plea bargaining in part on the 
assumption that the prosecution and the defendant “arguably possess relatively 
equal bargaining power” and engage in “give-and-take” negotiations.111 In 
practice, this often is not the case. Most federal criminal defendants are 
indigent and receive court-appointed counsel.112 Federal Public Defenders 
Offices have prestige and can attract good lawyers who often are passionate 
about their work. Still, they carry high caseloads and receive a government 
salary for their work far below what experienced litigators would receive in the 
private sector.113 Their caseload is not likely to be diminished if they take more 
cases to trial. In the face of these conditions, federal defenders have a huge 
incentive to encourage their clients to plead guilty.  
Private defense attorneys also have large incentives to plead out cases 
quickly. They are frequently paid as the case progresses through stages, and the 
trial is the most expensive stage. Many clients cannot afford to pay for their 
privately retained attorney to try their case. These defendants may start the case 
with retained counsel and end up with appointed counsel as the litigation 
slowly drains their bank accounts. Thus, public or privately retained defense 
attorneys usually lack sufficient incentive to fully investigate and 
systematically present favorable sentencing information to the court and 
prosecutor before the guilty plea is entered. Only a lucky few defendants get 
the kind of well-financed and skilled legal representation that our adversarial 
system contemplates.  
A related problem is the difficulty that defense attorneys, appointed or 
retained, face in determining their client’s actual sentencing exposure. This is a 
complicated task. True, defense attorneys who know the courthouse, the judges, 
and the U.S. Attorney’s Office can have a good sense of the “going rate” of 
particular kinds of cases. However, the real work of defending a case lies in 
distinguishing that case from the rest, in finding unique issues that pose legal or 
factual problems for the government. Defense attorneys vary widely in their 
financial and legal ability to do this.114 
 
111.  Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362 (1978) (quoting Parker v. North 
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970)).  
112.  “Approximately 85 percent of criminal defendants in the federal courts require 
court-appointed counsel.” ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
OPTIMAL UTILIZATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES 74 (1998), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps2770/Report.pdf. 
113.  FISHER, supra note 14, at 194-200. 
114.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Wake-Up Call from the Plea-Bargaining Trenches, 
19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 135, 138 (1994) (“[P]lea bargains are often struck on the basis of 
incomplete, highly imperfect information and little more than the attorney’s guess about 
what a trial might reveal if one were held.”); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 
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Even if a defense attorney discovers unique legal and factual issues that 
could bear on the disposition of the case, he or she must communicate this 
effectively to the prosecutor. Whether this communication occurs face-to-face, 
by telephone, or by email, it is certain to be off the record, and neither the judge 
nor the defendant is likely to be present. Such informal and unstructured 
negotiations do not encourage as full an exploration of these issues as one 
would expect from a public and court-monitored procedure. Likewise, without 
a public record being made, informal negotiations provide little guard against 
inadequate or even inaccurate defense presentations.115 This could be 
especially true where defense counsel has insufficient financial incentives to 
put the proper preparation and resources into case-dispositive negotiations.116  
The complexity of federal criminal litigation also adds to the difficulty for 
defense attorneys and prosecutors alike of determining the defendant’s actual 
sentencing exposure. Computing a defendant’s sentencing exposure under 
mandatory Sentencing Guidelines was hard enough, but in the wake of 
Supreme Court opinions making these Guidelines advisory, their application to 
a given case is even less certain.117 Novel sentencing issues often arise for 
which there is no “going rate.” And the fact patterns for many crimes, such as 
conspiracy and fraud cases, are highly complex. The plea deals that parties 
strike represent in part their best guess as to what the judge would do with the 
case. However, because most deals are struck without real input from the judge 
and most cases settle, the parties’ ideas about going rates may become self-
fulfilling prophesies. There are so few trials that their predictive value is 
lessened.118 Because judges most often simply ratify the parties’ deal, the 
parties never find out what the judge would have done had she had the 
opportunity to analyze the case independently.  
 
757-58 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea may still be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent 
even where defense counsel does not accurately predict the plea’s sentencing consequences). 
115.  See, e.g., W. Louis Sands, Plea Bargaining After Frye and Lafler, A Real Problem 
in Search of a Reasonable and Practical Solution (Meeting the Challenges of Frye and 
Lafler), 51 DUQ. L. REV. 537, 540-41 (2013) (describing the wide range of informal 
negotiations that occur in plea bargaining); Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of 
the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564, 564 (1977) (stating that “in the vast majority of 
cases, guilt and the applicable range of sentences are determined through information 
negotiations between the prosecutor and the defense attorney”).  
116.  See, e.g., Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2482 (noting that 
retained counsel may generally get better results in plea bargaining). 
117.  JENIA IONTCHEVA TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 27 (2009) (citing 
Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After Booker, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 721, 731 (2005)). 
118.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2481. 
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D. Because Plea Bargaining Is Not on the Record, the Results Lack 
Public Transparency, Consistency, and Thoroughness 
Before Rule 11 was amended in 1974, plea discussions and agreements 
were “informal and largely invisible.”119 In the courtroom, defendants, their 
attorneys, prosecutors, and judges alike made ritual denials that any promises 
had been made to the defendant.120 (One commentator referred to this 
procedure as a “pious fraud.”)121 This tended to drive plea bargaining 
“underground,” where it could not be regulated.122 While the 1974 
amendments required that bargaining be acknowledged in the guilty plea 
colloquy, the bargaining itself still goes on without court involvement, 
regulation, or clear rules and off the record.123 It lacks a “regularized advocacy 
procedure” which would foster transparency, rigor, consistency, and 
accountability.124 Much more can be done to bring plea bargaining out of the 
shadows and into the light. 
Our guilty plea system is essentially run by (well-meaning) professional 
insiders who process criminal cases with little public scrutiny.125 These 
insiders, including prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and probation 
officers, benefit from the arrangement because they can work out the case 
without external dissent according to their professional judgment.126 This is far 
removed from the democratic ideal of a public trial by one’s peers. 
As such, plea bargaining is largely invisible to the public, or even a 
representative sample of the public, as the Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury 
trial contemplates. Settlements create little fanfare. Prosecutors have little 
incentive to justify to the public the reasons for their charging concessions or 
their willingness to add more severe charges as a consequence of the defendant 
rejecting the plea offer.127 This is a powerful argument in favor of giving 
judges a greater role in the process because they, unlike prosecutors, are used to 
having to justify their decisions on the public record.128 Although it is true that 
 
119.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment (citing Arnold 
Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 108, 
115 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]). 
120.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment.  
121.  See also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 119, at 110-12.  
122.  Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970); see also TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 119, at 110-12. 
123.  Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650 (2013); 
Albert W. Alschuler, Personal Failure, Institutional Failure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 149, 151 (1986). 
124.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 287. 
125.  STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29-34 (2012). 
126.  Id.; see also King, supra note 22. 
127.  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
128.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 96-97 (2011) (quoting Testimony of 
James E. Felman on Behalf of the American Bar Association Before the United States 
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the public cannot keep informed of most criminal cases, a more public process 
for disposing of the cases would allow for better oversight, such as by trial and 
appellate judges, bar organizations, the attorney’s supervisors, crime victims 
and witnesses, concerned members of the affected community, journalists, and 
scholars.  
E. Presentence Reports Are Not Being Used Sufficiently 
 The presentence report systematically analyzes the sentencing factors set 
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 and therefore could be an important tool in 
determining a just sentence. Unfortunately, the parties cannot benefit from the 
report because they strike their deal before the report is ever prepared.129 
Some judges accept a plea bargain as long as the as-yet-unwritten 
presentence report later shows that the parties did not misrepresent any material 
facts to the court.130 Other judges take a slightly more expansive view of the 
presentence report’s potential by accepting the plea agreement provisionally, 
subject to change after the presentence report is written.131 But by the time of 
sentencing, they have a strong incentive to not upset the parties’ deal and the 
defendant’s expectations, regardless of what the presentence report says.132 
And if the court rejects the deal, the parties will have to engage in wasteful re-
negotiating, or worse, they may go to trial.  
It is true that defense lawyers may try to informally provide information to 
the prosecutor that would ultimately end up in the presentence report. But the 
presentence report offers a formal process for providing, evaluating, and 
structuring that information according to the statutory sentencing factors. It 
encourages and assists the defense to provide as much of that information as 
possible in a documented form. That information, embodied in a pre-plea 
presentence report, could be much more beneficial to the administration of 
justice earlier in the case. 
Furthermore, the presentence report may be highly influential to the 
prosecution because the court’s probation officer will have independently 
evaluated the information provided and possibly have conducted additional 
investigation. Thus, the pre-plea presentence report could be more likely to 
 
Sentencing Commission for the Hearing on Mandatory Minimums, 12-13 (May 27, 2010); 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American Bar Association 
Annual Meeting) (Aug. 9, 2003)); see Alan Dahl, Eric Holder’s Recent Curtailment of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, Its Implications, and Prospects for Effective Reform 
(2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dahl].  
129.  See also AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS 
OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.3(b) (3d ed. 1999) (mandating that judge should order preparation 
of presentence report after the parties have already reached a plea agreement).  
130.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1117. 
131.  Id. at 1116-18; Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a 
World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 296-300 (2005).  
132.  King, supra note 131, at 296-300. 
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give the prosecution flexibility and political cover to recommend a more 
reasonable sentence. 
There are practical limitations to what the pre-plea presentence report can 
accomplish. For example, the defendant should not be required to incriminate 
himself in making a statement to the probation officer although the court could 
perhaps order that any such statements not be used against the defendant should 
the case eventually proceed to trial. Furthermore, the probation officer is not 
likely to have the resources to conduct a truly independent investigation 
regarding information that the parties provide. But the presentence report could 
still serve as a valuable resource to the parties during plea negotiations.  
In the next Part, I describe a proposal to ameliorate the problems described 
in Part II. 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR JUDGES TO FRAME PLEA BARGAINING 
My proposal to address the shortcomings of federal plea bargaining 
described above in Part II is a defendant-initiated, pre-trial adversarial motion 
procedure that, with the help of a pre-plea presentence report, would frame plea 
bargaining by allowing the judge to provisionally declare guideline calculations 
and a maximum sentence on a guilty plea for the charges and a tentative 
maximum post-trial sentence. Such a proposal would help make all the parties 
aware of the likely sentencing consequences of the contemplated guilty plea. 
This proposal also would improve the administration of justice generally by 
creating a more formalized advocacy process for plea bargaining.  
In this Part, I describe my proposal in detail. I argue that this proposal does 
not run afoul of Rule 11’s restriction on judicial participation in plea 
discussions because the judge is merely informing the defendant of likely 
sentencing consequences.  
The motion for indicated sentences would be most effective if the 
defendant had maximum discovery to prepare for it. Although the law does not 
require this, the prosecution typically provides discovery early in the case.  
In determining the plea/trial differential in a particular case, the court 
would be guided by several factors. First, the court would need to consider in 
general the size of differential necessary to obtain sufficient guilty pleas to keep 
the court’s docket moving. Second, the court would consider the strength of the 
government’s case. Although this calculation is difficult to perform, there is 
precedent for it in the context of the Bail Reform Act, and the calculation is 
absolutely necessary for the court to calibrate the plea/trial differential 
correctly. Third, the court would consider the resources needed to try the case. 
Fourth, the court would consider, based on all the information available to it, 
whether a large plea/trial differential would unduly coerce a plea under all the 
circumstances.  
To give the defendant a firm basis for reliance, the court would generally 
be bound to its indicated sentences unless new information came to light after 
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the announcement of the plea/trial differential that could not reasonably have 
been known at the time of the motion. 
My proposal allows for the court to consider ex parte submissions in 
determining the indicated sentences. Otherwise, the parties would not bring to 
the court’s attention certain critical information they were unwilling to disclose 
to each other, in the event the case proceeded to trial. 
A. The Proposed Procedure 
The following procedure could be expressly authorized by amendments to 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,133 but even without such 
 
133.  Following is a proposed federal rule to implement my proposal:  
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.5 - Motion for Indicated Sentences 
(a)  Motion 
(1)  Within 30 days of arraignment, or at a later time for good cause 
shown, the defendant may move in writing for any of the following 
indicated rulings:  
(i)  an indicated sentence on a guilty or no contest plea,  
(ii)  an indicated sentence upon conviction at trial, and/or 
(iii)  indicated rulings on any issue related to sentencing (such 
as fines, restitution, or sentencing guidelines 
calculations).  
 (2)  If the court does not deny the defendant’s motion, the court shall, in 
open court: 
(i)  advise the defendant of his rights under Rule 11(b)(1) and 
ensure that the defendant understands that his motion for 
indicated sentences does not constitute a waiver of any of 
those rights,  
(ii)  obtain the defendant’s oral consent for the preparation 
and disclosure of a pre-plea presentence report,  
(iii) explain in general terms the procedures outlined in this 
rule and determine whether the defendant consents to 
them, and 
 (iv)  set a schedule for preparing the presentence report under 
Rule 32, briefing the motion, and holding a hearing. 
(b)  Hearing on the Motion  
 The court may hold a hearing on the motion. The court shall have discretion 
as to the scope and nature of the evidence presented, including whether the 
parties may proceed by way of reliable hearsay. If the defendant elects to 
testify, his statements shall not be introduced against him at a jury trial except 
on cross-examination for inconsistent statements. The court may consider ex 
parte evidence by a party, but the court shall not rely on that evidence at 
sentencing unless the opposing party has had an opportunity to rebut that 
evidence. 
(c)  Plea/Trial Differential 
 In determining the plea/trial differential, the court shall consider the 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, the caseload in the courthouse where 
the judge sits, and the strength of the government’s case. The court shall not 
impose a plea/trial differential that is coercive. 
(d)  Relief  
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amendments, the Rules should provide federal judges sufficient authority to 
implement a motion procedure that helps the defendant make what is typically 
the most important decision in the case: on what terms to plead guilty.134  
Early in the case,135 the defendant could elect to have defense counsel file 
a “motion for indicated sentences.”136 The motion could be brief, stating 
requests for (1) the preparation of a pre-plea presentence report, (2) indicated 
guideline calculations and the indicated sentence on a guilty plea, (3) an 
indicated post-trial sentence, and (4) a hearing. If desired, the defense could 
concurrently file any other motion, such as a motion to suppress evidence. The 
motion would need to expressly waive any objections under Rule 32 
concerning the disclosure of the presentence report to the court before the 
adjudication of guilt.137  
 
(1)  The court may deny or defer ruling on a motion for indicated 
sentences.  
(2)  If the court grants the motion in whole or in part, the court 
shall put the indicated rulings on the record.  
(3)  The court’s adjudication of the defendant’s motion for 
indicated sentences shall not by itself constitute participation 
in the parties’ plea discussions within the meaning of Rule 
11(c)(1).  
(e)  Exceeding the Indicated Sentences at Sentencing 
 If the court at sentencing decides to exceed its indicated sentences, it shall 
give the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty or no 
contest, unless the reason for exceeding the indicated sentences is based on 
either (1) circumstances which arose after the court decided the motion for 
indicated sentences or (2) information that was not known to the court and 
could not reasonably have been known to the prosecution at the time the 
indicated sentences were pronounced.  
(f)  Recusal 
 A judge who adjudicates a motion for indicated sentences shall not, on that 
basis alone, be required to recuse from the case. 
134.  See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2) (“A party may raise by pretrial motion any 
defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial of the general 
issue.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (“These rules are to be interpreted to provide for the just 
determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in procedure and fairness in 
administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay.”). Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17.1 provides for “pretrial conferences to promote a fair and expeditious trial.” 
My proposed procedure promotes a fair trial in the sense that it helps defendants to make an 
informed decision about whether to go to trial. The Advisory Committee Note opines that 
this rule “is cast in broad language so as to accommodate all types of pretrial conferences.” 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
135.  Ideally, the motion for indicated sentences would be made early in the case, when 
the parties were somewhat less entrenched in their plea bargaining positions and more open 
to input from a pre-plea presentence report and the court. An alternative to the defense 
motion is to make this procedure resulting in indicated sentences automatic (as by local rule) 
and allowing defense counsel to opt out.  
136.  The motion should generally be made in writing. FED. R. CRIM. P. 47(b). 
137.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1) (requiring written consent); accord AMERICAN BAR 
ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, standard 18-5.5 (3d ed. 1994) (allowing for 
preparation of a pre-plea presentence report); see also Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, 
supra note 4, at 1117. The local rules in some districts specifically provide for the 
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As a threshold matter, the court could not consider the motion without 
sufficient discovery from the prosecution. Likewise, the more information the 
defendant had about the government’s case against him, the better the decision 
he could make about his guilty plea.138 Although federal law limits a 
defendant’s right to pretrial discovery,139 defendants in typical federal cases do 
receive enough discovery early in the case to litigate a motion for indicated 
sentences, although local rules may provide for early discovery.140 Likewise, 
Department of Justice policy calls for most discovery to be produced early in 
the case.141 Although early discovery generally improves the administration of 
justice, federal prosecutors are not required by law to turn over discovery early 
in the proceedings.142 There are times where the prosecution has good reason 
not to provide early discovery, such as where such discovery might 
compromise ongoing investigations or endanger witnesses. In such cases, the 
prosecutor might inform the court, ex parte, of the circumstances, and the court 
might need to defer ruling on the motion for indicated sentences until sufficient 
discovery was provided.  
Assuming there was sufficient discovery to proceed, the judge would 
advise the defendant personally as follows: 
 You are presumed innocent throughout these proceedings. You have a 
right to plead not guilty and to persist in that plea. You have a right to a jury 
trial.  
 Your attorney has indicated that you want a pre-plea, presentence report to 
be prepared in this case. Is that correct? If I agree and order the preparation of 
such a report, you will not be giving up any of the rights that I just explained 
to you. I will consult the pre-plea presentence report and conduct a hearing on 
the motion. I then will determine indicated sentencing guideline calculations 
 
preparation of pre-plea presentence reports. See, e.g., D.N.M. LOCAL R. 32.G; N.D. OHIO 
LOCAL CRIM. RULES 32.2. Not all courts, however, have permitted this practice. See, e.g., 
Memorandum and Order on Motion for Pre-Plea Presentence Report at 1, United States v. 
Miguel Carrillo Rodriguez (D. Mass, Oct. 3, 2007) (No. 06-40007-FDS). 
138.  Professor Schulhofer advocates full civil-style discovery before a negotiated plea 
so that the parties fully understand the plea’s ramifications. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea 
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1998-99 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer]. The 
Supreme Court has held that Due Process does not require this. See United States v. Ruiz, 
536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). But I argue elsewhere that Due Process should require ample pre-
plea discovery. See Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 106 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2016), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2532568. 
139.  Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (“There is no general 
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”). 
140.  See, e.g., E.D. CAL., LOCAL R. CT. 440(a) (stating that, absent a court order, Rule 
16 discovery must be provided within fourteen days of arraignment). 
141.  David W. Ogden, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery: 
Memorandum for Department Prosecutors, JUSTICE.GOV (Jan. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00165.htm. 
142.  See, e.g., Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2012) (requiring production of written 
witness statements following their direct examination at trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 
(regulating criminal discovery without imposing time limits). 
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and a maximum sentence should you decide to plead guilty, as well as an 
indicated maximum sentence should you be convicted by a jury. If your case 
proceeds to jury trial, the pre-plea presentence report will not be used against 
you.  
 This motion procedure that you have requested is intended to give you 
information about possible sentencing outcomes so that you can make more 
informed decisions about your case. The pre-trial indicated sentence I give 
does not in any way obligate you to plead guilty. You have a right to a jury 
trial, and participating in this motion procedure does not in any way diminish 
that right. Do you have any questions about this procedure? 
Following this colloquy, the court would order the preparation of a pre-plea 
presentence report and set a date for the hearing. The parties would follow the 
normal procedure laid out in Rule 32 for the preparation of that report, 
including submitting evidence in aid of the probation officer’s presentence 
investigation, reviewing the draft report, submitting informal objections to the 
probation officer, receiving a final pre-plea presentence report, and filing 
formal objections with the court. The prosecution would need to provide 
discovery at this early stage of the case sufficient for the defense to litigate the 
motion for indicated sentences.  
At the motion hearing, the parties could put on evidence that would be 
relevant at trial or sentencing. Because of the abbreviated nature and limited 
purpose of the proceedings, the court would have discretion to disallow or 
circumscribe witness testimony in lieu of affidavits. If the defendant elected to 
testify, his statements could not be introduced against him at trial except in 
cross-examination for inconsistent statements. The evidence and testimony 
adduced at the hearing also could be admissible at sentencing. Certain issues 
might need to be handled ex parte. For example, where witness safety concerns 
weighed against disclosing a witness’s identity early in the case, the 
prosecution might provide to the judge an ex parte affidavit summarizing that 
witness’s testimony. The defense might make ex parte submissions of its case 
to avoid revealing its trial strategy. After submitting evidence to the court, the 
parties could make argument relative to the contested sentencing issues, 
including the expected plea/trial differential. 
Following the hearing, the court would advise the defendant of its indicated 
(estimated) maximum pre-trial sentence for the charges, assuming the 
defendant pleaded guilty, and an indicated plea/trial differential. The court also 
could make findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to sentencing 
guideline calculations, forfeiture, restitution, or any other sentencing issue that 
was the subject of the motion. 
My proposal echoes a proposal from the 1970s, yet my proposal is detailed, 
tailored to the federal system, and updated by four decades of legal 
developments.143 In 1972, Robert M. Sussman proposed that the court hold a 
 
143.  For another serious proposed procedure to put plea bargaining on the record, see 
Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 559, 588 (2013). For another 
thoughtful proposal by a federal judge to have magistrates act as private mediators in the 
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plea bargaining conference and then order a proposed plea disposition and a 
proposed post-trial disposition.144 The plea disposition would differ from the 
post-trial disposition by a “specific discount rate” that “would embody the 
median plea concession necessary to induce an administratively acceptable 
volume of guilty pleas in that jurisdiction.”145 Sussman’s proposal differs 
radically from my proposal in its view of prosecutorial discretion to charge. 
Under his proposal, the judge would exercise “full responsibility for the 
concessions the defendant receives in exchange for his plea,”146 effectively 
abrogating prosecutorial discretion to charge. Because that discretion is a key 
feature of our system, Sussman’s proposal is not feasible.147  
Unlike Sussman’s, my proposal calls for a case-specific plea/trial 
differential as opposed to a cookie-cutter “specific discount rate” for an entire 
jurisdiction.148 Whatever the merits of this idea, it is unlikely that judges in any 
courthouse of appreciable size could agree on such a rate. The aim of my 
proposal is more modest but more realistic: because judges already impose trial 
penalties on a case-by-case basis, they should make their best effort to calculate 
that differential on a case-by-case basis so that the defendant can make an 
informed decision.  
Finally, my proposal bears some similarity to a now superseded American 
Bar Association Standard.149 Its proposal, unlike mine, permitted the trial judge 
to participate as a “moderator” in the plea negotiations and make his or her own 
plea offer, as long as defense counsel and the prosecutor agreed to the judge’s 
participation.150 The Standard contemplated the preparation of a pre-plea 
presentence report and an evidentiary hearing, the scope of which lay solely in 
the court’s discretion.151  
 
plea bargaining process, see Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. 
BOOKS, Nov. 20, 2014, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/ 
nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty. 
144.  Sussman, supra note 6. 
145.  Id. at 301. 
146.  Id. at 287; see also id. at 301-02. 
147.  In 1974, Professor Albert W. Alschuler, a prominent plea bargaining critic, made a 
brief but similar proposal similar to Sussman’s. He proposed that the defendant initiate a 
“pretrial conference” for plea bargaining, that a simplified pre-plea presentence report be 
prepared for the conference, that the trial judge’s role in the proceeding be non-coercive, that 
the defendant be present, and that the proceeding be conducted on the record. But his 
proposal suffers from the same deficiencies as Sussman’s. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s 
Role, supra note 4, at 1124, 1146-49. For an excellent recent discussion of Alschuler’s and 
Sussman’s proposals, see RICHARD L. LIPPKE, THE ETHICS OF PLEA BARGAINING 16-28 
(2011) and Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in Plea Negotiations: A 
Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 199 (2006). 
148.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 301. 
149.  AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF 
GUILTY, Standard 14-3.3 (2d ed. 1979). 
150.  Id. at standard 14-3.3(c). 
151.  Id. at standard 14-3.3(c)-(e). 
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B. How to Determine an Appropriate Plea/Trial Differential 
The court’s first indicated sentence would be the sentence to be given on a 
plea, based on standard sentencing considerations.152 In this Part, I discuss the 
court’s second indicated sentence, which would equal the first plus a “plea/trial 
differential.” Rightly or wrongly, this differential is a key and durable feature 
of our system of pleas.  
Federal courts already impose longer sentences for defendants who 
exercise their right to trial.153 Indeed, the acceptance of responsibility reduction 
institutionalizes this practice.154 However, under our advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines regime, judges and prosecutors can and do tailor the plea/trial 
differential to the facts and circumstances of each case. Although many 
commentators have called for a uniform differential for all cases,155 those 
recommendations go against a strong ideal in criminal justice to treat cases 
individually. Even where Sentencing Guidelines promote uniformity and there 
are mountains of cases that need to be processed, the system eschews binding 
formulas. Plea bargaining prosecutors tailor the differential by threatening 
stiffer charges and greater post-trial sentences according to the facts of the case 
before them. Likewise, judges who sentence after trial tailor their sentences 
according to the facts and circumstances of the case.156 My proposal is unique 
in seeking to make the plea/trial differential more rational, consistent, and 
transparent, while still tailoring it to the facts of each case.157  
In calculating a plea/trial differential, the court could consider at least the 
following factors: the optimal number of guilty pleas for that courthouse, based 
on its caseload; the strength of the prosecution’s case; and whether the 
differential is unduly coercive in a given case.  
 
152.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (articulating procedure for 
sentencing hearings). 
153.  See Part II.A, supra. 
154.  Id.; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (holding that the 
prosecutor may impose stiffer charges on a defendant for refusing a plea offer and insisting 
upon a jury trial). Some state courts have sought to limit Bordenkircher’s reach. See 5 
LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 89, § 21.1(g) (3d ed. 2012) (Westlaw); see also People v. Collins, 
27 P.3d 726, 732 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he state may not punish a defendant for the exercise of a 
constitutional right, or promise leniency to a defendant for refraining from the exercise of 
that right” (citing United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968))); People v. Ellis, 658 
N.W.2d 142, 143 (Mich. 2003) (“[T]hat the practice that appears to have been utilized by the 
trial court in this case, commonly referred to as a ‘waiver break,’ is unethical and a ground 
for referral to the Judicial Tenure Commission in the future.”). Other courts have been more 
willing to recognize that guilty pleas lead to sentencing breaks. See, e.g., State v. Morrow, 75 
S.W.3d 919 (Tenn. 2002); People v. Dixon, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 637 (Ct. App. 2007). 
155.  See, e.g., Sussman, supra note 6, at 292-93, 301, 303; Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s 
Role, supra note 4, at 1125-29; Schulhofer, supra note 138, at 2003-08 (endorsing the 
solution proposed in Sussman, supra note 6); Covey, supra note 95, at 1268-86.  
156.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (mandating individualized consideration of the 
defendant, the offense conduct, and the need to deter). 
157.  Individual tailoring would not, however, preclude some absolute limit (e.g., 50%, 
100%, 200%) on the size of the plea/trial differential. 
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1. Optimal Number of Guilty Pleas 
First, given the local caseload, a judge could determine the average length 
of the plea/trial differential sufficiently large to incentivize an “administratively 
acceptable” number of guilty pleas.158 Judges should consider the caseload in 
their courthouse and available resources to try cases. In jurisdictions with 
heavier dockets, fewer jury trials are possible and a higher plea/trial differential 
is generally needed to exact sufficient guilty pleas to process the caseload.159 I 
propose that judges make this baseline explicit on the record.160 Although in an 
ideal world a defendant would not be disadvantaged for going to trial in a 
district with crowded dockets, my proposal would at least promote uniformity 
within the same courthouse or district. Of course, judges who do not intend to 
penalize defendants for the misfortune of being prosecuted in less-busy 
jurisdictions can simply put that fact on the record. To tailor the differential, 
judges would want to consider not only their caseload generally but also the 
resources that would be required to try the case at hand. Factors bearing on this 
decision would include the expected length of the trial, complexities in 
selecting a jury, the number of witnesses, enhanced security measures, and the 
need for court interpreters. 
2. Strength of the Prosecution’s Case 
Second, judges should consider the strength of the prosecution’s case in 
indicating a plea/trial differential. Prosecutors already do this because such 
individualized calibration is necessary to encourage enough defendants to plead 
guilty. To illustrate, consider two similarly situated federal defendants charged 
with the same crime.161 The first defendant faces a near-certain chance of 
conviction at trial and the other faces only a seventy percent chance. If they 
both get the same offer from the prosecution of a thirty-five percent sentencing 
“discount” (from the post-trial perspective), the first defendant will jump at the 
offer, but the second will reject it, knowing that the prosecutor will be reluctant 
to dedicate substantial resources to trying such a close case.162 Accordingly, the 
 
158.  Sussman, supra note 6. 
159.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 301-02 (proposing a discount rate that “would be 
uniform for all defendants within a given jurisdiction and would embody the median plea 
concession necessary to induce an administratively acceptable volume of guilty pleas in that 
jurisdiction”). 
160.  This comports with the common usage of the acceptance of responsibility 
reduction to incentivize guilty pleas. Judges have “wide discretion” in whether to apply the 
reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Melot, 732 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2013) (reviewing for 
clear error). 
161.  The following hypothetical is greatly simplified and does not take into account the 
myriad complicating factors of plea bargaining in the shadow of a jury trial, ably described 
by Professor Bibas. See Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37.  
162.  I am grateful to Professor George Fisher for helping me to develop this example. 
Email from George Fisher (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:25 a.m. PST) (on file with author). 
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prosecutor will have to give a larger discount to incentivize the second guilty 
plea, and the court should assist in the determination of the size of that 
discount. 
Federal judges already have precedent that could guide their determination 
of the strength of the prosecutor’s case. The Bail Reform Act, which governs 
bail decisions in federal court, requires judges to consider this factor in making 
bail decisions.163 The procedure for bail review hearings is similar to 
sentencing procedure and therefore instructive in how to determine the strength 
of the prosecution’s case in a motion for indicated sentences. The bail review 
hearing is a “full-blown adversary hearing”164 at which the defendant has the 
right to an attorney, “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses 
who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or 
otherwise.”165 The rules of trial evidence do not apply at the hearing.166 The 
district court has discretion to take evidence by live testimony or proffer.167 
The district court may limit any live testimony on grounds of relevance or to 
prevent a pre-trial detention hearing from becoming a full-blown trial.168 In 
short, the Bail Reform Act provides good precedent for how to provide 
adequate due process to litigate the strength of the prosecution’s case.169  
Several objections could be made to this portion of my proposal. For 
example, it could be argued that calibrating the plea/trial differential to the 
strength of the prosecution’s case would tempt the defendants who are most 
likely factually innocent with the best offers.170 While this may be true, this 
complaint overlooks the real issue: innocent defendants getting charged in the 
first place. Assuming that the prosecution’s case against an innocent defendant 
appears strong enough to convince twelve jurors beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that defendant would probably prefer to at least have the option of cutting his 
losses. Furthermore, my proposal would familiarize the judge with the facts of 
 
163.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2) (2012). Under the Act, the defendant is presumptively 
entitled to bail unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no bail 
conditions will reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance in court and protect the public. 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(g) (2012). In making that determination, the judge must consider “the 
available information concerning”: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged,” (2) “the weight of the evidence against the person,” (3) the defendant’s history and 
characteristics, and (4) the danger to the public if the defendant were released. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(g) (2012). Some courts have declared the weight of the evidence to be “the least 
important of the various factors,” United States v. Hir, 517 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008), 
perhaps because of the litigation difficulties it presents. 
164.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
165.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012); see also United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 948-49 
(6th Cir. 2010). 
166.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (2012). 
167.  United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). 
168.  Id. at 1398.  
169.  Due process “is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
170.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 292; Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 
1126-27; Covey, supra note 95, at 1250. 
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the case far beyond what could be learned from the spare factual basis 
underlying most plea agreements. That factual basis is a factor in determining 
the voluntariness of the plea by making sure that the defendant’s factual 
admissions constitute the crime to which he is pleading guilty.171 Armed with 
that knowledge, a judge would be in a much better position to decide if the 
prosecutor’s case was so weak that accepting a guilty plea would be 
unconscionable. In that case, the judge could refuse to accept the guilty plea.172 
Additionally, it could be objected that litigating the strength of the 
prosecutor’s case would not be easy. Prosecutors would have an incentive to 
exaggerate the strength of their case to force the plea. They might possess 
information not discoverable to the defendant that bears on the likelihood of 
acquittal. For example, the prosecutor may be aware that a particular law 
enforcement witness writes excellent reports but is nervous and impatient on 
the witness stand. Likewise, defense attorneys would have every incentive to 
downplay the prosecution’s case. Although the court cannot perfectly gauge the 
strength of the prosecution’s case, the court’s supervision of this procedure is 
likely to yield a better estimate of the strength of the case than informal 
discussions between the parties.  
Finally, it could be objected that considering the strength of the 
prosecution’s case in plea bargaining would tend to defeat sentencing 
uniformity.173 Suppose that persons A and B, having similar backgrounds and 
individual characteristics, conspire together to commit a crime. Suppose that 
the government has a strong case against A and a weak case against B.174 
Ideally, A and B would receive similar sentences to avoid “unwarranted 
sentence disparities.”175 But under my proposal, B will likely get a shorter 
sentence through sheer luck. This result is troubling but no worse than the 
status quo: nobody gets sentenced unless convicted, and convictions are easier 
to get when the evidence is strong.  
Thus, my proposal recognizes that plea bargaining is informed by the 
strength of the prosecution’s case. There are principled objections to this state 
of affairs, but the hard reality is that defendants plead guilty as a function of the 
strength of the case against them.176 By allowing a neutral arbiter to determine 
the strength of the prosecution’s case, my proposal would provide more 
 
171.  McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969). 
172.  Rule 11 grants this discretion. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c); see, e.g., United States v. 
Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea 
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2335 (2006) (“The partial ban system relies on courts 
to review the bargained-for sentences, requiring them to reject exceedingly lenient 
bargains.”). 
173.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 292-93. 
174.  As where evidence is suppressed due to an unlawful warrantless search in a place 
where B, but not A, has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
175.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012). 
176.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2464.  
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accurate incentives for guilty pleas and encourage consistency and transparency 
in the plea/trial differential. 
3. Potentially Undue Coercion 
The third and last consideration in determining the plea/trial differential is 
whether the differential is unduly coercive to a particular defendant. Coercion 
is inherent to any criminal justice system, but we must ask how much and what 
kind of coercion is acceptable. The plea/trial differential should not unduly 
pressure a defendant having a defense that is reasonably likely to succeed into 
pleading guilty.177 But the coercion inherent in the plea/trial differential may be 
mitigated by the advice of competent counsel and a “full opportunity to assess 
the advantages and disadvantages of a trial as compared with those attending a 
plea of guilty.”178 In other words, by reducing the unnecessary coercion of 
uncertainty, we can reduce the coercion of the plea/trial differential itself.  
The motion for indicated sentences provides just that by giving the defense 
reliable guidance as to the likely sentencing consequences that the defendant 
faces. The court, having familiarized itself with the strength of the 
prosecution’s case, should not accept a guilty plea if there is a “hazard of an 
impulsive and improvident response to a seeming but unreal advantage.”179 
The judge should be careful to consider any exculpatory evidence and 
weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. If the judge sees a high chance of 
acquittal, she can refuse to take the plea and inform the defendant that she will 
not increase the sentence based solely on the fact that he elected a jury trial. 
Alternatively, the prosecution, in an attempt to justify an apparently weak case, 
may present ex parte evidence to the court that might be inadmissible at a jury 
trial.  
Of course, there are limits on how well this procedure can monitor 
coercion. In a brief hearing, judges will not necessarily be able to determine if a 
defendant is innocent. And even if they do, they may not want to refuse a plea 
agreement where prosecutors are willing to supersede the indictment to add 
charges carrying heavy mandatory minimum sentences. Still, my proposal 
would somewhat improve the ability of judges to determine whether a plea is 
unfairly coerced. 
Some judges might be uncomfortable putting on the record their analysis of 
the above-listed factors, particularly factors such as caseload pressure, for 
which the accused is seemingly not responsible. Such judges seek to avoid 
violating the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, which prohibits them from 
 
177.  See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1969) (holding that plea bargaining is 
constitutional as long as it’s not coercive); see also Lucian E. Dervan, Bargained Justice: 
Plea-Bargaining’s Innocence Problem and the Brady Safety-Valve, 51 UTAH L. REV. (2012).  
178.  Brady, 397 U.S. at 754-55. 
179.  Id. at 754.  
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unduly burdening the constitutional right to a jury trial.180 As an alternative, 
such judges could explicitly rely on the acceptance of responsibility reduction 
by saying something along these lines: “Based on the information before me at 
this time, it appears that if the defendant goes to jury trial, he will not merit a 
two-point reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility, nor 
would the government likely make a motion for an additional point off under 
those circumstances. I have no intention of imposing a post-trial sentence in 
this case any greater than would be occasioned by the loss of acceptance of 
responsibility.” That advisement would give defendants the important 
assurance that they did not likely face the statutory maximum sentence post-
trial. This approach has the obvious benefit of simplicity and would be 
consistent with the uniform national acceptance of responsibility reduction. 
Although this alternative is a one-size-fits-all approach and is not ideal, it is an 
option for judges uncomfortable with putting too much of their analysis on the 
record.  
My proposal gives judges the flexibility to set case-specific plea/trial 
differentials that take into account their caseload, the strength of the 
prosecution’s case, the resources needed to try the case, and whether the 
differential is unduly coercive. Judges already consider caseload pressure in 
formulating post-trial sentences. By litigating the strength of the prosecution’s 
case, the defense will be less susceptible to prosecutorial bluffing, the 
defendant will get a second opinion—this one from the judge—as to his 
likelihood of conviction at trial, and the judge will be in a much better position 
to judge whether a plea offer is unduly coercive. A final advantage to this 
explicit and systematic consideration of the plea/trial differential is that it 
would foster better appellate review of the reasonableness of post-trial 
sentences.181 Of course, judges who do not intend to increase defendants’ 
sentences simply because those defendants chose to take their case to trial can 
simply advise their defendants of this fact at arraignment. 
C. When a Court May Exceed Its Own Indicated Sentences 
We next consider whether and under what circumstances a court may 
sentence the defendant in excess of the previously announced indicated 
sentences. Ideally, defendants would have an accurate pre-trial signal from the 
court that they could rely on, enforceable as a contract.182 But experience 
teaches that, after the court issues its indicated sentences but before sentencing, 
new information that should bear on the sentence often comes to light. For this 
 
180.  United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968). 
181.  See Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1132. 
182.  See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). Santobello is discussed in 
Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1068 n.33. 
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reason, the court cannot be contractually bound to its indicated sentences in the 
same way the prosecutor would be bound to the terms of a plea agreement.183  
My proposal depends on the parties sharing the relevant sentencing 
information with the court when the motion for indicated sentences is litigated. 
This is because if a court must consider making post-trial adjustments to its 
indicated plea/trial differential, the same set of factors that was useful ex ante is 
not sensible to consider ex post. For example, it makes little sense to try to 
readjust the defendant’s likelihood of acquittal (e.g., based on the actual 
performance of trial witnesses) following a conviction. Certain factors that are 
difficult to predict ex ante probably should not affect the sentence post trial, 
even if the judge’s prediction is incorrect. These include that the trial takes 
longer than the parties expected, or that the parties’ cases turn out to be 
stronger or weaker than predicted (such as where witnesses testify very poorly). 
Getting a reasonable ex ante assessment of the appropriate sentence is 
paramount because doing so will benefit nearly all defendants. In contrast, 
waiting until post-trial to consider the sentence is logically appealing but ill-
suited to our system of guilty pleas.  
However, new information may come to light during the litigation, 
especially if the parties conduct additional investigation as they prepare for 
trial. The court may need to consider this information at sentencing. 
Furthermore, it makes sense to accommodate post-trial adjustments to the 
estimated plea/trial differential based on the defendant’s conduct after the 
motion for indicated sentences. For example, the defendant might perjure 
himself on the witness stand or otherwise obstruct justice, as by threatening 
witnesses or destroying evidence.184 The trial may consume inordinate 
resources due to the defendant’s disruptive or dilatory conduct or because of his 
attorney’s excessive zeal.185 Alternatively, a crime victim might suffer unusual 
trauma by testifying.186 And vivid, in-person trial testimony may unexpectedly 
shed new light on the seriousness of the crime. 
The court’s indicated sentences are fact-specific determinations that should 
be reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion. That deferential standard would 
provide defendants sufficient protection from detrimental reliance; judges 
already have a strong incentive not to exceed their indicated sentences without 
good justification because in so doing, they might deter guilty pleas in other 
cases before them.187 In contrast, overly strict appellate review might increase 
 
183.  See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Melchor, 648 F.3d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 2011).  
184.  Under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, such conduct can dramatically increase 
the sentence, because a defendant who qualifies for obstruction of justice is usually ineligible 
for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.2 (2012) 
(setting out two-point enhancement for obstruction of justice); id. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.4 (2012) 
(mandating that there be no acceptance of responsibility reduction if defendant obstructs 
justice).  
185.  FISHER, supra note 14, at 179. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1094-95 n.111. 
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an already existing incentive to preserve greater flexibility at sentencing by 
offering too large plea/trial differentials. Ultimately, judges will have to 
determine the differential carefully and thoroughly, keeping in mind their 
ethical duty to give defendants accurate guidance in sentencing. 
Where the defendant pleads guilty, there may still be circumstances in 
which exceeding the indicated sentence on a plea could be justified. For 
example, the defendant’s own misconduct following the motion for indicated 
sentences might justify such an increase, but ordinarily the defendant should be 
afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea without penalty.188  
In summary, a court could justifiably exceed its indicated plea/trial 
differential where new information came to light after the announcement of the 
plea/trial differential that could not reasonably have been known at the time of 
the motion (except in those circumstances detailed above), or when the 
defendant’s conduct following the motion warranted it. Were it not so, the 
parties might have an incentive to hold back information from the court during 
the motion for indicated sentences. 
D. Considering Ex Parte Information 
The proposed procedure provides for the court to consider ex parte 
submissions in determining the indicated sentences. The court would not be 
able to rely upon such information at sentencing unless the opposing party had 
an opportunity to rebut the submissions.  
The court must be able to consider information that the parties, for good 
reason, would be unwilling to disclose to each other prior to an adjudication of 
guilt. The defense might not otherwise reveal the full circumstances of the 
crime. Such information could tend to simultaneously establish and mitigate the 
defendant’s guilt but could also give the prosecution ideas for further pre-trial 
investigation to shore up its case. Likewise, the prosecution would not want to 
make disclosures to the defense that might risk compromising ongoing 
investigations or endangering witnesses. But an ex parte procedure puts the 
relevant information before the court, either in the form of affidavits or even ex 
parte testimony. 
Any information that the parties submit ex parte should be considered by 
the court at sentencing only if the other party has had a chance to respond to it. 
If the other party does not get that chance, the court may have to allow the 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea or even void the plea due to fraud by the 
prosecution. 
 
188.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.5 (1994).  
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E. No Need for the Judge to Recuse If the Defendant Goes to Trial 
In the rare case where the defendant rejects the plea deal and elects a jury 
trial,189 some commentators have argued that the trial judge should recuse.190 
That judge, having gone to the trouble of issuing indicated sentences, would 
have arguably become personally invested in the case and impatient with the 
defendant’s protestations of innocence and rejection of the court’s offer. Such a 
judge may find it difficult to preside dispassionately over the trial.191 This 
concern is overblown because the information that a judge learns during a 
motion for indicated sentences is no different from other prejudicial 
information that the court inevitably learns without the need for recusal. 
Furthermore, judges routinely make other kinds of rulings that the parties 
dislike. Neither those rulings nor the parties’ reactions to them are generally 
considered to cause the judge to become so emotionally invested that recusal is 
required. 
Defendants have a due process right to a neutral and detached judge.192 
Thus, a judge must recuse herself for actual bias or prejudice.193 A judge must 
also disqualify herself where she has “a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding.”194 The right to a neutral and detached judge is so important that 
the law and judicial ethics provide for recusal where the judge’s “impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned,”195 even if no actual bias exists. This 
perception of fairness is central to judicial ethics because the accused and the 
public must perceive judges to be impartial if the justice system is to have 
democratic legitimacy.196  
Whether the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is the 
heart of the matter. A “reasonable person” is an objective, thoughtful, 
 
189.  See, e.g., Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1109. 
190.  See id. at 1111; Sussman, supra note 6, at 305-06.  
191.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1111; Sussman, supra note 6, 
at 305-06. 
192.  Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
193.  28 U.S.C. § 144 (2012); see also CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES, Canon 
3C(1)(a) (effective July 1, 2009). 
194.  28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (2012). 
195.  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2012); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11 (2010) (“A 
judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”); see also CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES 
Canon 3C(1) (2009). 
196.  CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW 1 (Kris Markarian ed., 2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter GEYH]. Judges 
must therefore act “at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety 
in all activities” (citing CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES CANON 2A); see also 
Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
191 (2012); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the 
Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 127, 156-58 (2011). 
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disinterested observer who knows all the surrounding circumstances.197 Such 
an observer would expect a judge to be able to hear information unfavorable to 
a defendant without losing impartiality. A well-informed observer to the 
criminal justice system would realize that judges often learn of information that 
reflects unfavorably on the defendant.198  
Furthermore, judges cannot ordinarily be considered biased, such that they 
must recuse themselves, based on what they learn about a case during the 
course of the proceedings.199 For example, experienced judges know that most 
defendants are guilty but are still able to presume that each defendant is 
innocent. Likewise, judges assume that a defendant who goes to trial has 
rejected the prosecution’s plea offer.200 Indeed, Frye suggests that this rejection 
be put on the record.201 Other prejudicial information that judges learn during 
the case comes from the indictment, bail motions and hearings, motions in 
limine under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), evidence that is 
probative of the defendant’s guilt that is suppressed for Fourth or Fifth 
Amendment violations, a pre-plea presentence report,202 and proffered trial 
evidence that the judge excludes as irrelevant or unduly prejudicial.203 Indeed, 
in the civil context, judges routinely provide informal guidance in mid-trial 
settlement negotiations without being thought incapable of handling subsequent 
phases.  
For practical reasons, automatic recusal is undesirable, though recusal 
would still be appropriate in some cases.204 Reassignment to a new judge 
causes duplication of work as that judge gets up to speed on the case. 
Reassignment also encourages forum-shopping: defendants might refuse the 
court’s offer in hopes of having reassignment to a more favorable judge.205 
Recusal is even less appropriate where, as with my proposal, the defendant has 
 
197. GEYH, supra note 196, at 18.  
198.  Id. at 19. 
199.  This is called the “extrajudicial source doctrine.” See id. at 30-31. They would not 
need to recuse unless they “display[ed] a clear inability to render fair judgment.” Liteky v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).  
200.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1108-11. 
201.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012). 
202.  A judge who sees a pre-plea presentence report and then presides over the trial 
would not normally be required to recuse. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 advisory committee notes to 
1974 amendment; see Webster v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 1080 (E.D. Va. 1971). 
203.  The civil context is also analogous where judges mediate settlement negotiations.  
204.  Although the Model Code of Judicial Conduct generally permits judges to 
encourage the lawyers to settle a matter, the comments warn that such participation can 
affect the judge’s objectivity and appearance of objectivity and may warrant disqualification. 
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6(b) & cmt. 3. 
205.  Alschuler acknowledges these problems, but still recommends that the judge 
recuse if the defendant goes to trial. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 
1111-12. 
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moved for indicated sentences and therefore supplied the judge with allegedly 
biasing information.206  
In summary, in the rare case that goes to trial, there is no need for judges to 
recuse simply because the defendants “rejected” the court’s indicated sentence 
on a plea. Judges frequently learn of prejudicial information during the 
litigation without holding it against defendants, and judges routinely make 
tough decisions in cases without become overly emotionally invested. They can 
be trusted to do the same in this context.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF MY PROPOSAL 
The most important implication of my proposal is that it would let judges 
judge. It would empower them to preside over litigation of meaningful 
sentencing issues when that litigation was most helpful. This would improve 
the adversary system in the context of plea bargaining. Furthermore, it would 
enhance the dignity of the court by letting judges influence the parameters of 
the parties’ plea discussions. In doing so, judges would not encourage guilty 
pleas or participate in the actual plea discussions.  
Several other advantages flow from involving the court in the plea 
bargaining process. Defendants would benefit because the procedure would 
help guide their attorneys in investigating the case and presenting it to the court 
and the prosecution. The parties could more accurately determine likely 
sentencing outcomes, leading to better negotiated resolutions, and defendants 
would be less likely to plead guilty based on their guess of how harsh their 
post-trial sentence might be. Guilty pleas would be more knowing and 
voluntary as a result. 
The proposal also would encourage prosecutors to act not merely as 
advocates for a case but as ministers of justice. Litigating a motion for 
indicated sentences, including the pre-plea presentence report, will assist 
prosecutors in formulating just plea offers and will hold prosecutors more 
publicly accountable for those offers. Finally, the public hearing on the motion 
for indicated sentences would give crime victims an opportunity to confer with 
prosecutors about the appropriate disposition of the case before the plea bargain 
was finalized.  
A. Let Judges Judge 
My proposal gives judges a significant role in framing the parties’ plea 
discussions. Judges are institutionally more neutral and less politically 
responsive than prosecutors. They take sentencing one case at a time instead of 
thinking in terms of law enforcement priorities and policies. Their enhanced 
role in the plea process could help guard against coercive plea bargains. Their 
 
206.  See GEYH, supra note 196, at § 4.05A (“To require recusal, bias or prejudice nor-
mally must be rooted in an extrajudicial source.”). 
2015] JUDGES AS FRAMERS OF PLEA BARGAINING 101 
enhanced role also would enhance truth-seeking and consistency in plea 
bargaining.  
In the federal system, United States Attorneys are presidential appointees. 
The work that they and their Assistants do is inherently political, although they 
have a strong ethic for merit-based promotions and doing justice the best they 
can. But the public often wants harsh, retributive justice from its agents. 
Prosecutors thus perform a difficult balancing act. They are ministers of justice, 
but they work in a system that is both political and adversarial; they cannot help 
but have their temperament shaped by their adversarial duties.207 Prosecutors, 
to secure convictions and avoid losing trials, are tempted to take the strongest 
cases to trial and plead out the weakest ones. The problem with this is that the 
weakest cases may be the most deserving of a trial, and to secure a plea in those 
cases, prosecutors might increase the plea/trial differential to coercive levels.  
In contrast, federal judges with life tenure are not accountable to voters for 
securing convictions and long sentences. Article III judges thus are better able 
to consider other purposes of the criminal justice system, such as rehabilitation. 
These judges tend to be well-seasoned lawyers and jurists with more 
experience than prosecutors,208 and their ethics center on impartiality. By 
weighing in on appropriate sentencing outcomes early in the case, judges could 
relieve prosecutors of some political pressure.  
By presiding over a full workup of cases on the record before the guilty 
plea, judges can help frame plea discussions according to public ends and help 
ensure that plea bargaining is more than a private agreement between 
prosecutors and defense attorneys. A formal adversarial proceeding conducted 
on the record “is more likely to foster formality and regularity, the use of 
adversary techniques for marshaling relevant information, and the introduction 
of procedural safeguards” than informal bargaining between prosecutors and 
defense attorneys.209 This proceeding is more likely to consistently take into 
account all of the critical statutory sentencing factors, including the criminal 
conduct;210 the defendant’s history and characteristics;211 alternatives to 
incarceration212 and how they might achieve the purposes of the criminal law; 
the United States Sentencing Guidelines;213 and “the need to avoid 
 
207.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1065. 
208.  Dahl, supra note 128, at 29 (citing Stanley Sporkin & Asa Hutchinson, Debate,  
Mandatory Minimums in Drug Sentencing: A Valuable Weapon in the War on Drugs or a 
Handcuff on Judicial Discretion?, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279, 1288 (1999)); see also 
Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1129-31. 
209.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1129-32; see also Sussman, 
supra note 6, at 303.  
210.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012). 
211.  Id.  
212.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(3) (2012). 
213.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)-(5) (2012); see also United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 
1029 (2d Cir. 1991) (encouraging prosecutors to inform defendants of likely sentencing 
guideline ranges, and judges to do the same, before the guilty plea). 
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unwarranted sentence disparities”214 and restitution215—formal litigation, 
rather than informal discussions. This is a complicated determination. The 
parties will arrive at better and more uniform plea bargains when a judge 
conducts a formal and public adversarial proceeding to frame the parties’ 
subsequent plea discussions with concrete information about likely sentencing 
outcomes. By giving judges a meaningful, neutral role in a process to which 
they have largely been excluded, my proposal enhances the dignity of the court.  
My proposal encourages judges to independently evaluate the parties’ plea 
bargain. The first canon of judicial ethics requires judges to “uphold and 
promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.”216 This 
canon applies with special force in the plea bargaining context.217 Likewise, the 
Supreme Court, by making the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, has re-
enthroned judicial independence in sentencing. Finally, Rule 11 itself evinces a 
policy of judicial independence in evaluating the waivers, voluntariness, and 
factual basis of the plea.218 Under the current plea bargaining regime, the court 
often pegs its thinking to the deal that the parties have already struck. In 
contrast, under my proposal, the court will consider the pre-plea presentence 
report, conduct an adversary hearing, and perform its own sentencing analysis 
of the case.  
This expanded role of the judge in helping to set the stage for future plea 
bargaining would push back somewhat against the American tradition of 
“adversarial legalism.”219 In our system, the parties, not the judge, direct the 
proceedings.220 This expresses an American ideal of populist, grassroots, 
locally democratic criminal justice.221 In contrast, judges figure more 
prominently in continental criminal justice systems. For example, in Germany, 
professional judges dominate the investigation, pre-trial procedures, and the 
trial itself.222 This serves the ideals of professionalism and consistency because 
an experienced and well-trained cadre of judges directs and decides the 
cases.223  
American-style plea bargaining fits squarely into the tradition of 
adversarial legalism, but there are reasons to question this regime. First, our 
system of pleas is essentially an administrative (not trial-based) criminal justice 
 
214.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2012). 
215.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7) (2012). 
216.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (2010). 
217.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY, 
standard 14-3.3(b)(ii) (3d ed. 1999) (mandating that the judge give proposed plea agreement 
“due consideration” but reach an “independent decision” regarding charging and sentencing 
decisions). 
218.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
219.  ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001).  
220.  Id. at 11. 
221.  Id. at 71. 
222.  Id. at 11. 
223.  Id. at 71. 
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system. The Department of Justice and its United States Attorneys direct this 
system; the courts do not.224 The cases are decided not by judges and juries but 
by prosecutors who bargain with the defense, subject to the court’s approval. 
This administrative system is characterized by informal, private negotiations 
between the parties—not structured, public proceedings that foster 
thoroughness, consistent application of law, and accountability.  
The parties to those informal negotiations cannot easily administer justice 
through this private administrative regime. As set forth above, prosecutors must 
respond to political pressures to which judges are immune. Defense attorneys 
do not always have the resources to effectively contend with prosecutors. 
Moreover, the prosecution’s head start in the investigation and control over the 
discovery put the defense at a disadvantage.225 The public is largely excluded 
from the plea bargaining process. In contrast, judges are suited by training and 
temperament to preside over a public, adversarial process that should 
characterize our criminal justice system.  
My proposal calls for federal judges to direct a procedure that, without 
participating in or even encouraging plea discussions, would frame and 
intelligently inform them. The judge would order the preparation of a pre-plea 
presentence report, order briefing on the motion, conduct a hearing, make 
preliminary findings as to contested issues (such as guideline calculations), 
satisfy herself that the defendant is in fact guilty, and indicate the plea/trial 
differential. This proposal imports some elements of the continental system of 
bureaucratic criminal justice to enhance truth-seeking and consistency in our 
own system of pleas. However, the proposed procedure is still firmly planted in 
adversarial legalism. The parties would still engage in private plea discussions 
without judicial participation and control the direction of the litigation. 
An added benefit to my proposed procedure is that by actively involving 
judges in the proceedings, the dignity of the court would be enhanced. 
Currently, most defendants have little interaction with the judge before 
sentencing. After arraignment, but before the guilty plea, they typically appear 
in court but a few times, as at status conferences and perhaps a suppression 
motion. They understand that the prosecutor is largely in charge of their 
case.226 In contrast, the defendant (and the public) might have a more positive 
view of judges if those judges played an active role in developing a record of 
the case before the guilty plea. Judges then could dispassionately give the 
accused concrete information about his sentencing options without coercion 
and without losing their own objectivity. The alternative is for judges to sit idly 
by while defendants waive their constitutional rights under a plea bargaining 
procedure that often lacks true adversarial combat and results in guilty pleas 
that are not fully informed. While the status quo does indeed preserve the 
 
224.  Lynch, supra note 35, at 2123-25. 
225.  See supra Part III.C. 
226.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1066. 
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impartiality of the court, the tradeoff is too little judicial participation in a 
system of pleas that is largely unregulated. 
B. Consistent with Rule 11’s Prohibition on Judicial Participation in Plea 
Discussions 
 Currently, Rule 11 does not allow the court to participate in plea 
discussions,227 and courts have interpreted this prohibition broadly.228 Ideally, 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure would be amended to clarify that 
judges may participate in my indicated motion procedure, without directly 
participating in the parties’ plea discussions. But even without that amendment, 
this proposal does not contravene Rule 11 or the principles of judicial ethics. 
Although several appellate cases interpret the prohibition strictly, newer 
Supreme Court precedents require a reexamination of these precedents. Thus, 
my proposal gives force to a key purpose of Rule 11: to ensure that those who 
waive their constitutional rights in exchange for perceived sentencing benefits 
do so knowingly and voluntarily.  
By its own terms, Rule 11 does not prohibit pre-plea presentence reports or 
hearings to provide indicated sentences. Instead, it requires that plea 
discussions be conducted without the court’s participation.229 Several courts 
have interpreted this prohibition strictly.230 But those decisions are wrong to 
the extent that they prevent judges from telling defendants the likely 
consequences of their guilty plea. In fact, the Supreme Court has recently 
strengthened this principle. In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that 
defense counsel was ineffective in failing to advise the defendant that a guilty 
plea carried the risk of deportation.231 Just as defendants should not plead 
guilty without correct legal advice about the risk of deportation, they should not 
plead guilty without correct legal advice concerning their likely sentence. 
A good example of a decision that takes the Rule 11 prohibition too far is 
United States v. Werker,232 discussed supra in Part II.B. There, the Second 
Circuit stated that “the indication of sentence inevitably invites alterations and 
clarifications of the proposed sentence through direct negotiations with the 
judge.” But this need not be so—the court can issue indicated sentences based 
on the charges before it without rendering an advisory opinion.233 The Werker 
 
227.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
228.  See supra note 68. 
229.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1); see also MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.6(B) 
(2010) (“A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in 
dispute, but shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement.”). 
230.  United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2146 (2013) (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 
advisory committee notes to 1974 amendment. 
231.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  
232.  535 F.2d 198, 203 (2d Cir. 1976). 
233.  Indicated sentences are not advisory opinions. First, they are preliminary orders to 
be revisited by the same judge at sentencing. Second, they do not meet either of the 
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court argued that where the parties only come to the court because they reached 
an impasse in the negotiations, “the judge’’s response to the inquiry becomes 
the essential element in the ensuing discussions.”234 But providing valuable 
information to the parties in the context of their impending plea negotiations is 
not the same as participating in their plea negotiations. Providing timely and 
relevant information just helps ensure that whatever deal the parties ultimately 
strike is well-founded on the defendant’s likely sentencing exposure. 
Rule 11 already requires judges to be involved in the plea bargaining 
process in ways similar to those rejected by the Werker court. For example, 
judges may use their discretion to reject a plea bargain.235 In the rare case in 
which they do so, they must put their reasons on the record.236 That 
explanation, of course, will likely influence future negotiations between the 
parties.237 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has sensibly held that such 
explanations do not constitute judicial participation in plea discussions.238  
Likewise, whereas the Werker court rejected advisory sentences, Rule 11 
already requires the court to advise defendants of “any maximum possible 
penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release”239 and 
any mandatory minimum penalty.240 Advising the defendant of the likely, as 
opposed to maximum, sentencing consequences of a guilty plea is conceptually 
similar to advisements that Rule 11 already requires. Such an announcement 
would not involve the court at all in any actual plea discussions. Furthermore, 
advising the defendant of maximum penalties is itself somewhat coercive, a 
powerful reminder of the risk of not pleading guilty. In contrast, advising the 
defendant of a likely sentence below the statutory maximum is actually less 
coercive than advising of the statutory maximum without clarifying that such a 
 
traditional criteria for advisory opinions: there is an actual dispute between the litigants; and 
there is a substantial likelihood that the indicated sentences will affect the defendant’s 
decision of whether to plead guilty. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 53-60 (3d ed. 2006).  
234.  Werker, 535 F.2d at 203. 
235.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).  
236.  See, e.g., United States v. Kraus, 137 F.3d 447, 453 (7th Cir. 1998). 
237.  Id. 
238.  Id. 
239.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H). 
240.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(I). Interestingly, before 1974, the Rule was broader and 
required an advisement of the “consequences of the plea.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory 
committee notes to 1974 amendment. That former advisement presumably included not only 
statutory maxima and mandatory minima, but also collateral consequences (such as how the 
conviction might affect parole eligibility). It appears that the intent of the amendment 
narrowing the advisement was to make it more feasible for the court to give reliable 
advisements that could be determined from the face of the statutes. However, the pendulum 
is swinging back the other way—courts often advise defendants of other consequences to 
their felony guilty pleas, like deportation, see Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the 
denial of federal welfare benefits, 21 U.S.C. § 862 (2012), and ineligibility for parole (which 
was abolished in the federal system in 1984). 
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sentence is highly unlikely. Thus, Rule 11’s flat prohibition should not be 
interpreted too strictly, and Werker should be overruled.  
Even if Rule 11 were to prohibit the issuing of indicated sentences, under 
my proposal, the defendant invokes the procedure and therefore forfeits any 
protection from the prohibition to the extent that the procedure runs afoul of the 
prohibition at all. And even if that right were not forfeited, any violation of it 
would be harmless error.241  
It should be remembered that Rule 11 is a prophylactic, not a 
constitutional, rule.242 Its purposes are, first, to “assist the district judge in 
making the constitutionally required determination that a defendant’s guilty 
plea is truly voluntary” and, second, “to produce a complete record at the time 
the plea is entered of the factors relevant to this voluntariness 
determination.”243 An overly strict reading of Rule 11’s prohibition on judicial 
participation in plea discussions has taken the focus away from encouraging 
and documenting voluntary pleas. A plea is only voluntary where the defendant 
is “fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any 
commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel.”244 
Such a plea cannot stand if induced by threats or misrepresentations.245 The 
prohibition as interpreted has unnecessarily deterred judges from any 
involvement in the plea bargaining process. This not only has allowed plea 
bargaining without the benefits of an adversarial procedure to inform it, but 
also has resulted in pleas that are less voluntary because the misleading threat 
of a maximum possible sentence is the only sentencing guidance they get from 
the judge before they reluctantly plea bargain with the prosecutor.  
Rule 11’s prohibition and the interpreting case law, like Werker, have 
discouraged judges from openly participating in the plea bargaining process. 
But, the prohibition has not eliminated judges’ influence in plea bargaining. 
Many judges award very high sentences to defendants who lose at trial; the 
parties know this, and the prosecution uses this to its advantage in plea 
negotiations.246 A reputation for draconian sentencing—in which the judge 
maintains a menacing silence regarding plea negotiations—is more coercive 
than the light but constructive judicial involvement proposed in Werker. 
 
241.  The denial of a Rule 11 right is reviewed for plain or harmless error. FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 11(h); United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2149 (2013).  
242.  Davila, 133 S. Ct. at 2142; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 463-64 
(1969). 
243.  McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465. 
244.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United 
States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d per curiam on other grounds, 
356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
245.  Id. 
246.  Ulmer, supra note 20, at 2; see also People v. Earegood, 162 N.W.2d 802, 809 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1968).  
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Likewise, if the judge has a reputation for lenient sentencing after trial, the 
parties take that fact into account as well.247 
Furthermore, there are more flexible ways to regulate judicial plea 
bargaining besides Rule 11’s prophylactic rule against any judicial participation 
in plea discussions. For example, the American Bar Association’s Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct states, “A judge may encourage parties to a proceeding and 
their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but shall not act in a manner that 
coerces any party into settlement.”248 This standard strikes the right balance 
between letting judges participate in the plea bargaining process and guarding 
against judicial coercion. Recent Supreme Court cases are consistent with this 
approach. As discussed in Part II.B above, Lafler and Frye already require 
judges to become involved in the plea bargaining process by making a pre-trial 
record of defense counsel’s effective plea bargaining assistance. And Davila 
makes clear that Rule 11 violations will be reviewed only for plain or harmless 
error. My proposal is a small step indeed toward putting more of the plea 
bargaining process on the record. 
C. Provides Defendants Greater Certainty and Better Assistance of 
Counsel 
My proposal will eliminate some sentencing uncertainty. In Santobello v. 
New York, the Supreme Court held that the plea bargain was enforceable 
against the prosecution like any ordinary contract.249 My proposal is consistent 
with a consumer protection view of plea bargaining contracts because it seeks 
to make the consequences of the plea more clear to the defendant, just as 
consumer protection laws help people to understand common but complicated 
transactions like buying a used car. 250  
More certainty would be especially helpful to defendants who face long 
maximum sentences. Those defendants may feel pressure to plead out, even 
though most of them would be sentenced to far below the statutory maximums, 
even following a jury trial. Since the judge advises the defendant of the 
maximum possible sentence, it is only fitting that the judge also advises the 
defendant of the likely sentencing outcomes.  
This procedure also would help defendants when the facts of the case are 
relatively sympathetic, but the defendant still wishes before pleading guilty to 
assess how the court views those facts. If the court sees the case as the 
prosecutor does, then the defendant is out of luck. But if the court takes a more 
 
247.  Earegood, 162 N.W.2d at 809. 
248.  MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.6(B) (2010). Before judges participate in 
settlement discussions, comments to that Rule ask judges to consider several factors, such as 
whether the parties have requested such participation, the sophistication of the parties, 
whether the case will be tried to a judge or jury, and whether the matter is civil or criminal.  
Id. at cmt. 2. 
249.  Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  
250.  Bibas, Regulating, supra note 3. 
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favorable view of the facts, and the indicated sentences so reflect, the defendant 
would gain leverage in subsequent plea negotiations. Without the motion for 
indicated sentences, that same defendant might have pleaded guilty on less 
favorable terms and the court might have rubber-stamped the plea agreement.  
Likewise, in cases with unusual facts or charges, the parties have a harder 
time predicting how the court will sentence. Certain statutes, like marriage 
fraud,251 are seldom used. Certain defendants, like those who are mentally ill, 
may seem more sympathetic and simultaneously more likely to recidivate. In 
those cases, courts may be even less inclined than usual to follow the advisory 
Sentencing Guidelines, and the parties, especially the defendant, would benefit 
from indicated sentences.  
Second, although there is no substitute for adequately skilled and resourced 
defense counsel, my proposal aids in the effective assistance of counsel at the 
plea bargaining stage by helping defense counsel develop a record of 
sentencing issues and informing defense counsel and the defendant directly of 
the likely sentencing outcomes. In Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court 
addressed how to ensure against late, frivolous, or fabricated claims that 
defense counsel failed to convey plea offers to the defendant. The Frye court 
suggested that prosecutors make written plea offers and that those offers go on 
the record.252 My proposal strengthens and works in harmony with the Frye 
regime because it causes the likely sentencing outcomes to be put on the record. 
The more plea bargaining is put on the record, the less reviewing courts will 
encounter situations in which defendants allege that an offer was not conveyed 
or that they did not understand the potential sentencing consequences they 
faced. Additionally, the Lafler court’s observation that “an erroneous strategic 
prediction about the outcome of a trial is not necessarily deficient performance” 
implies that counsel could potentially be ineffective for failing to correctly 
predict the likelihood of conviction.253  
Another reason why defense counsel might favor my proposal is that the 
motion procedure and indicated rulings would help to formally structure the 
plea negotiations. This would focus the parties’ attention on key issues, holding 
their feet to the fire with judicially imposed deadlines and demanding from 
both parties a more systematic consideration and presentation of the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors. Finally, indicated sentences may also help ameliorate the 
low trust that defendants have toward appointed counsel because if the judge 
weighs in on likely sentencing consequences, defendants will not have to place 
so much trust in their attorneys.254 In short, my proposal defines a formal 
process to help all defense attorneys provide good representation in plea 
 
251.  8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012). 
252.  Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408-09 (2012); see also supra Part II.B. 
253.  Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1391 (2012); Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the 
Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 126, 127 (2012). 
254.  Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside, supra note 37, at 2478. 
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bargaining and to give defendants more certainty about the potential sentence 
they face.  
D. Benefits to Prosecutors and Crime Victims 
My proposal benefits other players in the system. It encourages prosecutors 
to act as ministers of justice instead of simply an advocate for convictions and 
long terms of imprisonment.255 Prosecutors who have to engage in the 
litigation required for a presentence report will be better able to make plea 
offers based on the whole context of the case. Also, prosecutors inclined to 
lenience may find some political cover in my proposed procedure because the 
court and the probation officer generally would have already made their views 
known before plea discussions began in earnest.256  
My proposal also would incentivize prosecutors not to strong-arm 
defendants into pleading guilty by threatening to add more serious charges to 
the indictment.257 After the court goes to the trouble of deciding a motion for 
indicated sentences, the prosecutor would risk the court’s ire by adding new 
charges and effectively starting the case over. Following arraignment, many 
federal cases lie virtually dormant from a litigation standpoint until the guilty 
plea. Thus, judges are indifferent to prosecutors’ superseding the indictment. In 
contrast, my proposal creates some inertia around the original charges by 
moving a portion of the sentencing litigation to the beginning of the case.  
If prosecutors are involved in crafting the presentence reports before plea 
discussions begin, they will be better able to determine a just sentence.258 
Whereas a typical plea offer might currently be based primarily on the 
seriousness of the defendant’s crime and criminal history, the prosecutor’s plea 
offer should take into account all the purposes of sentencing: punishment, 
incapacitation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, including how the incarceration 
will affect the defendant’s family and community and the future collateral 
effects of incarceration upon the defendant after his sentence is served. 
Prosecutors will more systematically consider all these purposes if, early in the 
case, they have to think through formal and informal objections to the pre-plea 
presentence report early in the proceedings and have the opportunity to discuss 
the matter in open court with the judge and the defense attorney.259 
 
255.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (“A prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). 
256.  Of course, prosecutors who want to play hardball will still be able to supersede the 
indictment with stiffer charges. I deal with this objection below. 
257.  This practice is permitted under Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).  
258.  Id.; Gabriel J. Chin, Taking Plea Bargaining Seriously: Reforming Pre-Sentence 
Reports After Padilla v. Kentucky, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 61 (2011) (arguing that pre-
plea presentence reports would make waivers of rights in guilty pleas more knowing and 
voluntary). 
259.  See Sussman, supra note 6, at 290. 
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On a systemic level, there are good reasons for the Department of Justice to 
favor my proposal. By loosening prosecutors’ grip on the system, it would help 
prosecutors to better exercise their discretion and thereby enhance the 
Department’s reputation for seeking justice, not just swift convictions. 
Furthermore, my proposal also could benefit crime victims by giving them 
a more significant role in the plea bargaining process. Crime victims already 
have “[t]he reasonable right to confer with” federal prosecutors about plea 
bargaining and sentencing in their case.260 However, this right to confer does 
not at all limit prosecutors’ discretion to dispose of cases as they see fit.261 
Victims also have a right to be “reasonably heard” in court regarding the 
defendant’s guilty plea and sentencing.262 A public hearing about potential 
sentencing consequences in the case would facilitate victims conferring with 
prosecutors before plea deals were struck and make it harder for prosecutors to 
plead out cases too cheaply. However, if the defense anticipates damaging 
victim testimony at a motion for indicated sentences, it may elect not to move 
for indicated sentences at all. 
E. Possible Objections 
 Several objections could be made to my proposal. I address them below. 
1. Litigation Costs 
First, adding a pre-trial motion procedure in every felony case would 
impose additional litigation costs on the system. This criticism is partly blunted 
by the fact that much of the work of the motion for indicated sentences, such as 
the preparation of the presentence report and holding a quasi-sentencing 
hearing, would have to be done anyway during the sentencing phase of the 
case. To the extent that the work would need to be done later in the case 
anyway, doing it earlier in the case would not put a drag on the system; indeed, 
doing that same work early in the case could greatly improve the administration 
of criminal justice.  
 
260.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2012) (codifying the right to confer). “Prosecutors should 
make reasonable efforts to notify identified victims of, and consider victims’ views about, 
prospective plea negotiations.” OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ235121, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM 
AND WITNESS ASSISTANCE 41 (2012). But see In re W.R. Huff Asset Management Co., 409 
F.3d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Nothing in [Crime Victims’ Rights Act] requires the 
Government to seek approval from crime victims before negotiating or entering into a 
settlement agreement.”) (cited in CHARLES DOYLE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 
REPORT, PUB. NO. RL33679, CRIME VICTIMS’ RIGHTS ACT: A SUMMARY AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS OF 18 U.S.C. 3771 (2012)). 
261.  18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) (2012). 
262.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 60(a)(3); cf. Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 18 USC § 3771(a)(4) 
(2012). 
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Still, it is likely that a motion for indicated sentences would result in higher 
litigation costs. For example, the parties often enter into a plea agreement on 
issues that otherwise would need to be litigated at sentencing, such as disputed 
guideline variables or the defendant’s ability to pay a fine. In a motion for 
indicated sentences, the defense might prefer to litigate some of those issues. 
This would require the district court to adjudicate some issues that the parties 
might otherwise have privately resolved. However, such litigation would help 
ensure that key issues in the case were explored, developed, and decided in a 
public forum, resulting in a more fair procedure and a more just outcome.263 
Furthermore, my procedure could be fruitless in those cases—fewer than ten 
percent—that do not result in convictions.264 The silver lining is that this 
procedure might hasten the dismissal of weak, unfounded, and unwise 
prosecutions. 
The motion for indicated sentences may be filed before the defense files a 
suppression motion, but for the purposes of the motion for indicated sentences, 
the court should assume that such a motion would be denied. The prosecution 
often relies on potentially suppressible evidence in plea bargaining.265 The 
parties each make their own assessments of how likely the judge is to suppress 
the evidence. Motions to suppress are seldom granted.266 Therefore, the risk is 
small that the court will be exposed to evidence in the indicated sentence 
proceedings that would ultimately be suppressed. Also, considering suppression 
motions at every motion for indicated sentences could raise the litigation cost 
of the procedure so high as to render it impractical in most cases.267  
There may be other complicated issues that the parties do not wish to 
litigate. In those instances, the court could issue indicated sentences in the 
alternative based on the parties differing positions. For example, calculating the 
“loss” in a fraud case can be intricate.268 If the defense estimates the fraud loss 
to be much lower than the prosecution’s estimate, they may ask the court to 
issue two sets of indicated sentences: one that assumes the defense estimate to 
be correct and another that assumes the same about the prosecutor’s.  
An additional cost would arise in litigating the plea/trial differential 
(including the strength of the government’s case) because that factor obviously 
is not litigated at sentencing. However, the advantages of this plea/trial 
differential are twofold: first, it gives the parties, especially defendants, 
valuable information about actual sentencing consequences; second, it allows 
 
263.  Cf. Owen Fisk, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (discussing 
that in civil context, settlement aims to maximize the ends of private parties, while 
adjudication uses public resources to give force to constitutional and legal values). 
264.  UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2012/12statrpt.pdf. 
265.  See United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1970). 
266.  Prudent prosecutors often spot suppression issues in advance and never charge the 
cases at all. 
267.  See Sussman, supra note 6, at 311. 
268.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b) n.3. 
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the court to examine the potentially coercive effect of that plea/trial 
differential.269 And most of the litigation needed to determine the plea/trial 
differential would have to be done anyway in preparing the presentence report.  
Thus, even though the motion for indicated sentences would probably 
entail somewhat higher litigation costs, these costs would be modest, especially 
in comparison with the gains to the system in fairness and efficiency. 
Furthermore, because the defendant would have to elect to file the motion, it is 
not anticipated that the motion would be filed in every case.  
Related to this first objection is the concern that prosecutors will try to 
“game the system” by offering special plea deals to defendants who plead 
guilty without causing the prosecution and the court to go through the trouble 
of litigating a motion for indicated sentences. The root of that concern is that 
the motion for indicated sentences would be so onerous that not filing it would 
become another bargaining chip for the defense. And defendants who use this 
chip but do not like the prosecutor’s concession might go ahead and file the 
motion anyway to see if the judge takes a more favorable view of the case.270 
However, because the motion would usually involve work that would need to 
be done at the sentencing phase, I do not believe that prosecutors would grant a 
substantial sentencing concession in such cases. Furthermore, although it is 
common practice for prosecutors to offer significant sentencing concessions for 
jury trial waivers, they do not always penalize defendants for filing non-
frivolous pre-trial motions. Many, if not most, federal prosecutors see them-
selves as ministers of justice. Ideally, they would come to view the motion for 
indicated sentences as a sensible approach to curtailing the excesses of plea 
bargaining by involving the court at an earlier stage in the proceedings.  
2. Presumption of Innocence 
A second objection to my proposal is that preparing a presentence report 
and holding what amounts to a sentencing hearing before an adjudication of 
guilt contravenes the presumption of innocence.271 This criticism is largely 
blunted by the fact that the defendant alone could authorize this procedure and 
would still be presumed innocent until he pleaded guilty or the matter were 
submitted to the finder of fact. A much greater countervailing concern, 
 
269.  My proposal bears some similarity to another that would tie the plea offer to the 
maximum post-trial sentence by a fixed percentage (e.g., if the maximum plea/trial 
differential is twenty percent and the plea offer is for five years, then the maximum post-trial 
sentence would be six years). See Covey, supra note 95. Both proposals are concerned with 
the coerciveness of the plea/trial differential, but mine allows the judge to tailor the plea/trial 
differential to the case at hand and does not allow the prosecutor to tie the judge’s hands at 
sentencing. 
270.  Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role, supra note 4, at 1102. Under Alschuler’s 
proposal, plea bargaining before the motion for indicated sentences would be unethical 
because the parties could reach an agreement before the motion procedure, rendering that 
procedure an empty formality. Id. at 1147 n.291. 
271.  Sussman, supra note 6, at 291. 
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addressed by my proposal, is that the plea/trial differential itself burdens the 
presumption of innocence because it pressures all defendants, innocent or not, 
to forego constitutional rights and plead guilty.272  
Even though the motion for pre-plea presentence report and indicated 
sentences does not actually defeat the presumption of innocence, a defendant 
presented with the option might think that it did. Although most defendants 
plead guilty, many do not plan to do so at the beginning of the case. If they are 
not presented with the option of filing a motion for indicated sentences in the 
right way, they might lose confidence in the system’s fairness. Thus, defense 
attorneys must take care in presenting this option to their clients, and the courts 
must give the advisements273 and conduct the motion proceeding so as to make 
clear that the accused truly is presumed innocent.  
3. Leaves Prosecutorial Discretion Intact 
A third objection is that by leaving prosecutorial discretion intact, this 
proposal would allow prosecutors to file new charges if they were not satisfied 
with the judge’s indicated sentences. This is true. My proposal seeks to be 
practical, and limiting prosecutorial discretion seems politically infeasible. 
However, I do not believe that federal prosecutors would often file new charges 
following the motion for indicated sentences, unless they wanted to leverage a 
plea using a mandatory minimum charge. 
Primarily, new charges would not affect the sentence in most cases. 
Federal prosecutors are already supposed to charge “the most serious, readily 
provable charge” at the outset of the case.274 Federal courts consider all 
“relevant conduct” at sentencing.275 Relevant conduct essentially includes all 
conduct related to the offense of conviction, even if the defendant was neither 
charged with nor convicted of certain aspects of that offense.276 The sentencing 
guidelines likewise typically focus on the facts of the case, not the charged 
violation, in enhancing sentences.277 Thus, the prosecutor’s legal 
characterization of the offense will often have little impact on the sentence, and 
adding or dismissing particular charges will not make much of a difference.278  
 
272.  Id. at 288.  
273.  See supra Part IV.A. 
274.  U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.430 (2009). 
275.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 1, Part B, § 1.3 (2013). 
276.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 1, Part A, § 1.4(a). 
277.  To facilitate plea bargaining, prosecutors sometimes try to skew the court’s 
perception of the case by not revealing relevant conduct to the court and probation. Ulmer, 
supra note 20, at 24 (surveys of federal prosecutors confirms existence of “fact-bargaining”). 
But this would defeat the purposes of sentencing and contravene Department of Justice 
policy. U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.400 (“Plea bargaining . . . must honestly reflect 
the totality and seriousness of the defendant’s conduct.”). 
278.  When a case is soon to be tried, prosecutors sometimes add charges to the 
indictment that are easier to prove or that give the jury an opportunity for a “compromise 
verdict,” that is, to convict on some charges but not on others. Often the compromise verdict 
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Prosecutors might be reluctant to add more serious charges following a 
motion for indicated sentences because the case would have already gotten 
some exposure in the courtroom and even in public, and prosecutors do not like 
to publicly admit that they are bringing new charges solely to leverage a guilty 
plea.  
Even if the prosecution does supersede the indictment, the judge would 
have a strong incentive to anchor future sentences to those original indicated 
sentences. First, the judge would have already considered the case on the first 
go-round and capped the penalties. Psychologically, the judge might tend to 
anchor future consideration of the case based on that first impression. Second, 
judges would want to incentivize prosecutors not to seek a superseding 
indictment because that could result in a renewed motion for indicated 
sentences. As repeat players in the system, judges would likely communicate to 
prosecutors, both directly and indirectly, their displeasure at being put through 
that same exercise twice.  
One important exception where new charges could indeed sharply increase 
the sentence is statutes with a mandatory minimum. A prosecutor not satisfied 
with the court’s indicated sentences could in many federal cases effectively 
override them by bringing new charges with mandatory minimum penalties.279 
However, the Department of Justice has recently begun to curtail its use of 
mandatory minima for certain nonviolent, low-level drug offenders.280  
Additionally, all things being equal, prosecutors prefer not to bring new 
charges in a pending case, and that would be especially true following a motion 
for indicated sentences. New charges must be justified to the grand jury, 
judges, defense counsel, and the public. To some extent, new charges can 
“reset” the case, putting a drag on the system by resetting the speedy trial clock 
and changing the elements of proof, thereby requiring additional defense 
 
is an illusion, because the sentence is usually based on the relevant criminal conduct, 
regardless of how it is legally characterized. See Orin Kerr, The Criminal Charges Against 
Aaron Swartz (Part 2: Prosecutorial Discretion), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/16/the-criminal-charges-against-aaron-swartz-part-2-
prosecutorial-discretion (describing this charging strategy in the context of cyber-crime 
prosecutions under Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), (a)(4); § 1343).  
279.  These charges are most prominent in drug prosecutions, which comprised about 
thirty percent of all federal prosecutions in 2012. Most of those cases involve the use or 
threat of mandatory minimums. The frequency of other common types of federal 
prosecutions is as follows: immigration cases (32.2%), fraud (10.5%), and firearms (9.8%). 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OFFENDERS IN EACH PRIMARY OFFENSE CATEGORY (FISCAL YEAR 
2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research_and_Statistics/Annual_Reports_and_ 
Sourcebooks/2012/FigureA.pdf. The sentences in drug cases are usually driven by 
mandatory minimums. 
280.  ERIC HOLDER, MEMORANDUM TO THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS AND ASSISTANT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE CRIMINAL DIVISION, Department Policy on Charting 
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases 
(August 12, 2013). The “Smarter Sentencing Act of 2013” (S.B. 1410), a bi-partisan bill 
cutting most mandatory minimums in drug cases in half, was approved by the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on January 30, 2013 but ultimately died. 
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investigation. In cases whose motion for indicated sentences has garnered 
media attention, the public may not agree with the prosecutorial decision to 
hold back on the strongest charges in an attempt to leverage a plea. Others may 
not agree with adding stiffer chargers solely because the defendant—who is 
supposedly presumed innocent and has a right not to incriminate himself— 
refused to plead guilty.281 Courts may consider stiffer charges to be 
vindictive.282 As argued above in Part VI.E, my proposal encourages the 
prosecutor to act as a minister of justice and not to engage in gamesmanship 
with the court. In summary, federal prosecutors generally already prefer to 
initiate the case with the most serious, readily provable charges since doing so 
may call less attention to itself than adding charges after a defendant refuses to 
plead guilty. The motion for indicated sentences should only strengthen that 
norm.  
4. Length of Proceedings  
A fourth objection to my proposal is that this proposed motion procedure 
would delay the proceedings, impair the defendants’ speedy trial rights, and in 
some cases lengthen pre-trial custody. Although there is some merit to these 
objections, the benefits of the motion for indicated sentences will likely 
outweigh any delays to individual cases, given the already long lifespan of 
most federal cases. 
In the context of the average federal criminal case, the delay in the 
proceedings occasioned by this motion is not significant. In 2004, a federal 
felony case took an average of more than ten months to wend its way to 
completion in the district court.283 Probation officers may need one to two 
months to complete a draft pre-plea presentence report. The parties would then 
need one to two months to fully brief the motion and litigate the contents of 
that report. Thus, most federal cases could accommodate the three months or so 
of litigation that the motion for indicated sentences would ordinarily entail.  
One important exception to this is immigration cases, which constitute 
about a third of federal prosecutions.284 They typically last no more than a few 
months. About two-fifths of those cases are illegal reentry cases under 8 U.S.C. 
 
281.  See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that prosecutors should bring the most serious charge at the beginning of the case 
because superseding indictments to increase the penalties would appear vindictive to the 
public).  
282.  United States v. LaDeau, 734 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal where 
prosecutor had originally charged a child pornography case with no mandatory minimum 
penalty and brought a new charge carrying a five-year mandatory minimum only after losing 
a suppression motion). 
283.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, COMPENDIUM OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 59-60 (2004). 
284.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N (2012), supra note 279. 
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§ 1326.285 Several districts are authorized to operate “fast track programs,” 
under which defendants, in exchange for pleading guilty early in the case, are 
offered a substantial (up to four levels) sentencing discount in addition to the 
acceptance of responsibility reduction. Those defendants are typically in pre-
trial detention and are under enormous pressure to plead guilty. Some districts, 
like the Eastern District of California, have pre-plea presentence reports 
prepared to give those defendants more sentencing certainty. Perhaps an 
abbreviated version of my procedure would be appropriate in such cases: some 
districts are already using pre-plea presentence reports to provide greater 
certainty to all parties; because those cases are generally so simple, the court 
could still have time to issue indicated sentences, especially where it had no 
intention of imposing the ten-year or twenty-year max based on the facts in the 
presentence report. 
Other categories of cases may likewise not be good candidates, such as 
where the defendant is in custody and a few months of pre-trial detention could 
dwarf the expected post-trial sentence.  
The motion for indicated sentences should pose no difficulties under the 
Speedy Trial Act. Federal defendants have a constitutional right to a speedy 
trial286 and a statutory right to a trial generally within seventy days of being 
indicted.287 However, those time periods are routinely tolled in most districts 
for a multitude of statutorilydefined reasons.288 Most defendants are willing to 
waive their right to a speedy trial because they believe that the additional time 
benefits their defense. A motion for indicated sentences initiated by the 
defendant would fall into that category, too. In fact, many cases could move 
more quickly as a result of this motion. The parties often spend significant time 
in plea negotiations, and this motion, by triggering court-imposed deadlines, 
could help the parties work more expeditiously to identify the key issues early 
in the case.  
A more fundamental response to this objection that the proposed procedure 
would unduly delay the proceedings is that in a regime where virtually all 
defendants plead guilty, many defendants might value the protections that my 
proposed procedure would afford them over their right to a speedy trial.  
 
285.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, IMMIGRATION OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 17 (2010), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iofjs10.pdf. 
286.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
287. Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (2012). 
288. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2012). Time spent litigating and adjudicating a motion for 
indicated sentences would be excluded from the seventy days as a pending pre-trial motion. 
18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) (2012). Additionally, if the court ordered the preparation of a pre-
plea presentence report, the time necessary to prepare that report could also be excluded as 
“reasonable time necessary for effective preparation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (2012).  
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CONCLUSION 
Although federal law has made some strides in acknowledging the 
dominance of guilty pleas, plea bargaining has been kept in the shadows 
because of Rule 11’s overly strict injunction against judicial participation in 
those discussions. As a result, most of the plea bargaining process is informal 
and off the record. But judges could participate usefully in the process without 
actually sitting at the bargaining table.  
My proposal brings an important stage of plea bargaining into the light: 
allowing the court to help frame the issues for the parties’ plea negotiations. By 
allowing the parties, with the defendant’s consent, to litigate the appropriate 
sentence early in the case with the benefit of a pre-plea presentence report, the 
judge has an opportunity to become familiar with the case and provide 
indicated sentences that the parties can rely on in their subsequent plea 
negotiations. The judge also can guard against plea offers that are unduly 
coercive, as where the government’s case is very weak. The defense attorney 
can systematically flesh out in open court the mitigating factors for the 
prosecution and the court to consider at sentencing. The prosecutor can get 
greater feedback from the court, the probation officer, and the defense about 
appropriate sentence in the case. And the public nature of this pre-plea 
sentencing litigation keeps all the system’s professional players more 
accountable to the public for how criminal cases are resolved. 
Federal criminal procedure has generally rested on at least two 
assumptions: first, that trials determine guilt or innocence and second, that 
judges preside over the proceedings. Plea bargaining’s triumph over criminal 
procedure has conclusively thrown out the first assumption.289 But the second 
need not be thrown out as well. In fact, as I have demonstrated, our system of 
pleas could work much better if we let judges frame the parties’ plea 
negotiations. My proposal is a step in that direction, with real benefits to 
defendants and the public alike. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
289.  See FISHER, supra note 14. 
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